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ABSTRACT   This paper explores the consequences for economic research 
of methods used by data publishers to protect the privacy of their respondents. 
We review the concept of statistical disclosure limitation for an audience of 
economists who may be unfamiliar with these methods. We characterize what it 
means for statistical disclosure limitation to be ignorable. When it is not ignor-
able, we consider the effects of statistical disclosure limitation for a variety of 
research designs common in applied economic research. Because statistical 
agencies do not always report the methods they use to protect confidentiality, we 
also characterize settings in which statistical disclosure limitation methods are 
discoverable; that is, they can be learned from the released data. We conclude 
with advice for researchers, journal editors, and statistical agencies.
This paper is about the potential effects of statistical disclosure limita-tion (SDL) on empirical economic modeling. We study the methods 
that public and private providers use before they publish data. Advances 
in SDL have unambiguously made more data available than ever before, 
while protecting the privacy and confidentiality of identifiable informa-
tion on individuals and businesses. But modern SDL intrinsically distorts 
the underlying data in ways that are generally not clear to the researcher 
and that may compromise economic analyses, depending on the specific 
hypotheses under study. In this paper, we describe how SDL works. We pro-
vide tools to evaluate the effects of SDL on economic modeling, as well as 
some concrete guidance to researchers, journal editors, and data providers 
on assessing and managing SDL in empirical research.
Some of the complications arising from SDL methods are highlighted by 
J. Trent Alexander, Michael Davern, and Betsey Stevenson (2010). These 
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authors show that the percentage of men and women by age in public-
use microdata samples (PUMS) from Census 2000 and selected American 
Community Surveys (ACS) differs dramatically from published tabulations 
based on the complete census and the full ACS for individuals age 65 and 
older. This result was caused by an acknowledged misapplication of confi-
dentiality protection procedures at the Census Bureau. As such, it does not 
reflect a failure of this specific approach to SDL. Indeed, it highlights the 
value to the Census Bureau of making public-use data available—researchers 
draw attention to problems in the data and data processing. Correcting these 
problems improves future data publications.
This episode reflects a deeper tension in the relationship between the 
federal statistical system and empirical researchers. The Census Bureau 
does not release detailed information on the specific SDL methods and 
parameters used in the decennial census and ACS public-use data releases, 
which include data swapping, coarsening, noise infusion, and synthetic 
data. Although the agency originally announced that it would not release 
new public-use microdata samples that corrected the errors discovered 
by Alexander, Davern, and Stevenson (2010), shortly after that announce-
ment it did release corrections for all the affected Census 2000 and ACS 
PUMS files.1 There is increased concern about the application of these SDL 
procedures without some prior input from data analysts outside the Census 
Bureau who specialize in the use of these PUMS files. More broadly, this 
episode reveals the extent to which modern SDL procedures are a black box 
whose effect on empirical analysis is not well understood.
In this paper, we pry open the black box. First, we characterize the inter-
action between modern SDL methods and commonly used econometric 
models in more detail than has been done elsewhere. We formalize the data 
publication process by modeling the application of SDL to the underlying 
confidential data. The data provider collects data from a frame defining 
an underlying, finite population, edits these data to improve their quality, 
applies SDL, then releases tabular and (sometimes) microdata public-use 
files. Scientific analysis is conducted on the public-use files.
Our model characterizes the consequences for estimation and inference 
if the researcher ignores the SDL, treating the published data as though 
they were an exact copy of the clean confidential data. Whether SDL is 
ignorable or not depends on the properties of the SDL model and on the 
1. See the online appendix, section B.1. Supplemental materials and online appendices 
to all papers in this volume may be found at the Brookings Papers web page, www.brookings. 
edu/bpea, under “Past Editions.”
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analysis of interest. We illustrate ignorable and nonignorable SDL for a 
variety of analyses that are common in applied economics.
A key problem with the approach of most statistical agencies to modern 
SDL systems is that they do not publish critical parameters. Without know-
ing these parameters, it is not possible to determine whether the magni-
tude of nonignorable SDL is substantial. As the analysis by Alexander, 
Davern, and Stevenson (2010) suggests, it is sometimes possible to “dis-
cover” the SDL methods or features based on related estimates from the 
same source. This ability to infer the SDL model from the data is useful in 
settings where limited information is available. We illustrate this method 
with a detailed application in section IV.B.
For many analyses, SDL methods that have been properly applied will 
not substantially affect the results of empirical research. The reasons are 
straightforward. First, the number of data elements subject to modification 
is probably limited, at least relative to more serious data quality problems 
such as reporting error, item missingness, and data edits. Second, the effects 
of SDL on empirical work will be most severe when the analysis targets 
subpopulations where information is most likely to be sensitive. Third, SDL 
is a greater concern, as a practical matter, for inference on model param-
eters. Even when SDL allows unbiased or consistent estimators, the vari-
ance of those estimators will be understated in analyses that do not explicitly 
correct for the additional uncertainty.
Arthur Kennickell and Julia Lane (2006) explicitly warned economists 
about the problems of ignoring statistical disclosure limitation methods. 
Like us, they suggested specific tools for assessing the effects of SDL on 
the quality of empirical research. Their application was to the Survey of 
Consumer Finances, which was the first American public-use product to 
use multiple imputation for editing, missing-data imputation, and SDL 
(Kennickell 1997). Their analysis was based on the efforts of statisticians 
to explicitly model the trade-off between confidentiality risk and data 
usefulness (Duncan and Fienberg 1999; Karr and others 2006).
The problem for empirical economics is that statistical agencies must 
develop a general-purpose strategy for publishing data for public consump-
tion. Any such publication strategy inherently advantages certain analy-
ses over others. Economists need to be aware of how the data publication 
technology, including its SDL aspects, might affect their particular analy-
ses. Furthermore, economists should engage with data providers to help 
ensure that new forms of SDL reflect the priorities of economic research 
questions and methods. Looking to the future, statisticians and computer 
scientists have developed two related ways to address these issues more 
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systematically: synthetic data combined with validation servers and privacy-
protected query systems. We conclude with a discussion of how empirical 
economists can best prepare for this future.
I. Conceptual Framework and Motivating Examples
In this section we lay out the conceptual framework that underlies our 
analysis, including our definitions of ignorable versus nonignorable SDL. 
We also offer two motivating examples of SDL use that will be familiar to 
social scientists and economists: randomized response for eliciting sensi-
tive information from survey respondents and the effect of topcoding in 
analyzing income quantiles.
I.A. Key Concepts
Our goal is to help researchers understand when the application of SDL 
methods affects the analysis. To organize this discussion, we introduce 
key concepts that we develop in a formal model in the online appendix. 
We assume the analyst is interested in estimating features of the model that 
generated the confidential data. However, the analyst only observes the 
data after the provider has applied SDL. The SDL is, therefore, a distinct 
part of the process that generates the published data.
We say the SDL is ignorable if the analyst can recover the estimates 
of interest and make correct inferences using the published data without 
explicitly accounting for SDL—that is, by using exactly the same model as 
would be appropriate for the confidential data. In applied economic research 
it is common to implicitly assume that the SDL is ignorable, and our defini-
tion is an explicit extension of the related concept of ignorable missing data.
If the data analyst cannot recover the estimate of interest without the 
parameters of the SDL model, the SDL can then be said to be nonignorable. 
In this case, the analyst needs to perform an SDL-aware analysis. How-
ever, the analyst can only do so if either (i) the data provider publishes 
sufficient details of the SDL model’s application to the confidential data, 
or (ii) the analyst can recover the parameters of the SDL model based 
on prior information and the published data. In the first case, we call the 
nonignorable SDL known. In the second case, we call the nonignorable 
SDL discoverable.
I.B. Motivating Examples
Consider two examples of SDL familiar to most social scientists. 
The first is randomized response, which allows a respondent to answer 
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a sensitive question truthfully without revealing the answer to the inter-
viewer. This yields more accurate responses, since respondents are more 
likely to answer truthfully, but at the cost of adding noise to the data. The 
second example is income topcoding, which is a form of SDL that protects 
the privacy of high-income households. This example highlights the fact 
that the ignorability of SDL is a function not just of the SDL method but 
also of the estimand of interest.
RANDOMIZED RESPONSE Stanley Warner (1965) proposed a survey tech-
nique in which the respondent is presented with one of two questions 
that can both be answered either “yes” or “no.” The interviewer does 
not know the question. The respondent opens an envelope drawn from a 
basket of identical envelopes, reads the question silently, responds “yes” 
or “no,” and then destroys the question. With a certain probability the 
question is sensitive (for example, “Have you ever committed a violent 
crime?”), and with a complementary probability the question is innocuous 
(for example, “Is your birthday between July 1st and December 31st?”). 
Again, the interviewer records only the “yes” or “no” answer and never 
sees the true question.
If one runs this single-question survey on a sample of 100 people cho-
sen randomly, the estimated proportion of “yes” answers has an expected 
value equal to the probability that the respondent was asked the sensitive 
question times the population probability (in our example) of having 
committed a violent crime plus the complement of the probability that 
the respondent was asked the sensitive question times one-half. If the 
sample mean proportion of “yes” answers is 26 percent, then to recover 
the implied estimate for the population probability of having commit-
ted a violent crime one needs to know the probability that the sensitive 
question was asked. The standard error of the estimated proportion of 
“yes” answers is 4.4 percent, but the standard error for the estimated 
population proportion of having committed a violent crime is 4.4 percent 
divided by the probability that the respondent was asked the sensitive 
question.
Why is this a form of statistical disclosure limitation? Because no one 
other than the respondent knows which question was asked, this procedure 
places bounds on the amount of information that anyone, including the 
interviewer, can learn about the respondent’s answer to the sensitive ques-
tion. (See section II.B for a complete discussion.) This form of SDL is obvi-
ously not ignorable. The data analyst does not care about the 26 percent but 
wants to estimate the proportion of people who have committed a violent 
crime. The data publisher adds the following documentation about the SDL 
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parameters: Only half the respondents were asked the sensitive question; 
the other half were asked a question for which half the people in the popu-
lation would answer “yes.” Now the analyst can estimate that the propor-
tion who committed a violent crime is 2 percent, and its standard error is 
8.8 percent. Notice that the SDL affected both the mean and the standard 
error of the estimate.
CONSEQUENCES OF TOPCODING FOR QUANTILE ESTIMATION Richard 
Burkhauser and others (2012) provide a simple, vivid example of the 
consequences of SDL for economic analysis. Because of SDL, changes 
in the upper tail of the income distribution are largely hidden from view in 
research based on public-use microdata, most often the Current Population 
Survey (CPS). Because income is a sensitive data item, and large incomes 
can be particularly revealing in combination with other information, the 
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics both censor incomes 
above a certain threshold in their public-use files. The topcoding of income 
protects privacy, but it also limits what can be done with the data.
Burkhauser and others (2012) report that the income topcode results 
in 4.6 percent of observations being censored. Thus, the topcoded data 
are perfectly fine for measuring the evolution of the 90-10 quantile ratio 
but completely useless for measuring the evolution of incomes among 
the top 1 percent of households, as was revealed when Thomas Piketty 
and Emmanuel Saez (2003) analyzed uncensored income data based 
on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax filings. Piketty and Saez (2003) 
showed that trends in income inequality look quite different in the 
administrative record data than in the CPS. Using restricted-access CPS 
data, Burkhauser and others (2012) showed that the difference between 
the administrative and survey data was largely due to censoring in the 
survey data.
If we could observe all the confidential data, Y, they would have prob-
ability distribution function pY(Y) and cumulative distribution function 
FY (Y ). For studying income inequality, interest centers on the quantiles of 
FY, defined by the inverse cumulative distribution function QY. When draw-
ing inferences about the quantiles of the income distribution, topcoding 
is irrelevant for all quantiles that fall below the top-coding threshold, T. 
We say top-coding is ignorable if, for a given quantile point of interest 
p ∈ [0, 1], QZ(p) = QY(p), where QZ(p) is the quantile function of the 
published data, Z.
This very familiar example highlights several features of ignorable and 
nonignorable SDL. First, whether SDL can be ignored depends on both 
the properties of the SDL mechanism and the specific estimand of interest. 
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Second, assessing the effect of SDL requires knowledge of the mechanism. 
If the value of the topcode threshold T were not published, it would not be 
possible for the researcher to assess whether a specific quantile of interest 
could be learned from the published data. The researcher might learn the 
topcode by inspecting the published data. In this case, we say the topcode 
is a discoverable form of SDL.
The work of Jeff Larrimore and others (2008) also illustrates how, when 
armed with information about SDL methods and access to the confidential 
data, researchers can improve their analysis with minimal change to the 
risk of harmful or unlawful data disclosure. Larrimore and others (2008) 
published new data for 24 separate income series for 1976–2006 that con-
tain the mean values of incomes above the topcode values within cells, dis-
aggregated by race, gender, and employment status. They show that these 
cell means can be used with the public-use CPS microdata to analyze the 
income distribution in ways that would otherwise require direct access to 
the confidential microdata.
In the randomized response example, the SDL model is known as long 
as the probability that the sensitive question was asked is disclosed. With-
out disclosure of this probability, the researcher is unable to perform an 
SDL-aware analysis because it is not discoverable. By contrast, an un - 
disclosed topcode level may still be discoverable by a researcher through 
inspection of the data.
II. The Basics of Statistical Disclosure Limitation
The key principle of confidentiality is that individual information should 
only be used for the statistical purposes for which it was collected. More-
over, that information should not be used in a way that might harm the 
individual (Duncan, Jabine, and de Wolf 1993, p. 3). This principle 
embodies two distinct ideas. First, individuals have a property right of 
privacy covering their personal information. Second, once such personal 
data have been shared with a trusted curator, individuals should be pro-
tected against uses that could lead to harm. These ideas are reflected in the 
development and implementation of SDL among data providers. For the 
United States, the Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology (Harris-
Kojetin and others 2005) has produced a very thorough summary of the 
objectives and practices of SDL.
The constant evolution of information technology makes it challeng-
ing to translate the principle of confidentiality into policy and practice. 
The statutes that govern how statistical agencies approach SDL explicitly 
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prohibit any breach of confidentiality.2 However, statisticians and computer 
scientists have formally proven that it is impossible to publish data without 
compromising confidentiality, at least probabilistically. We touch in our 
conclusion on how public policy should adapt in light of new ideas about 
SDL and privacy protection. The current period of tension also character-
izes the broader co-evolution of science and public policy around SDL, 
which we briefly review.
II.A. What Does SDL Protect?
SDL may appear to protect against unrealistic, fictitious, or overblown 
threats. Reports of data security breaches, in which hackers abscond with 
terabytes of sensitive individual information, are increasingly common, 
but it has been roughly six decades since the last reported breach of data 
privacy within the federal statistical system (Anderson and Seltzer 2007, 
for household data; Anderson and Seltzer 2009, for business data). One 
is hard-pressed to find a report of the American Community Survey, for 
example, being “hacked.” Yet it is important to acknowledge that the prin-
ciple of confidentiality for statistical agencies arose from very real and 
deliberate attempts by other government agencies to use the data collected 
for statistical purposes in ways that were directly harmful to specific indi-
viduals and businesses.
Laws to protect data confidentiality arose from the need to separate the 
statistical and enforcement activities of the federal government (Anderson 
and Seltzer 2007; 2009). These laws were subsequently weakened and 
violated in a small but influential number of cases. For example, the U.S. 
government obtained access to confidential decennial census information 
to help locate German and Japanese Americans during World Wars I and 
II, and from the economic census to assist with war planning. The privacy 
laws were subsequently strengthened, in part because businesses were 
quite reluctant to provide information to the Census Bureau for fear that 
it could either be used for tax or antitrust proceedings or be used by their 
2. U.S. Code Title 13, Section 9, governing the Census Bureau, prohibits “any publica-
tion whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment or individual under this 
title can be identified” (see https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/13/9, accessed August 6, 
2015). U.S. Code Title 5, Section 552a (part of the Confidential Information Protection and 
Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002), which governs all federal statistical agencies, requires 
them to “establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure 
the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or 
hazards to their security or integrity which could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, 
inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom information is maintained” (see 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a, accessed August 6, 2015).
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competitors to reveal trade secrets. The statistical agencies therefore also 
have a pragmatic interest in laws that protect individual and business infor-
mation against intrusions by other parts of the federal and state govern-
ments, since these laws directly affect willingness to participate in censuses 
and surveys.
The modern proliferation of data and advances in computing technol-
ogy have led to new concerns about data privacy. We now understand 
that it is possible to identify an individual from a very small number of 
demographic attributes. In a much-cited study, Latanya Sweeney (2000) 
shows how then publicly available hospital records might be linked 
to survey data to compromise confidentiality. Arvind Narayanan and 
Vitaly Shmatikov (2008) show that supposedly anonymous user data 
published by Netflix can be re-identified. Although no harm was docu-
mented in these cases, they highlight the potential for harm in the world 
of big data.
Paul Ohm (2010) argues that for every individual there may be a “data-
base of ruin” that can be constructed by linking together existing non-
ruinous data. That is, there may be one database with some embarrassing 
or damaging information, and another database with personally identifi-
able information to which it may be linked, perhaps through a sequence of 
intermediate databases. In some cases, there are clear financial incentives 
to seek out such a database of ruin. A potential employer or insurer may 
have an interest in learning health information that a prospective employee 
would rather not disclose. If such information could be easily and cheaply 
gleaned by combining publicly available data, economic intuition suggests 
that firms might do so, despite the absence of documented instances of such 
behavior. An alternative perspective is offered by Jane Yakowitz (2011), 
who argues for legal reforms that reduce the emphasis on hypothetical 
threats to privacy and expand the emphasis on the benefits from providing 
accurate, timely socioeconomic data.
II.B. Concepts and Methods of SDL
Modern SDL methods are designed to allow high-quality statistical infor-
mation to be published while protecting confidentiality. Since many applied 
researchers may have an incomplete awareness of and knowledge about 
the ways in which SDL distorts published data, we provide an overview 
of the most common SDL methods applied to economic and demographic 
data. For a more technical and detailed treatment, we refer the reader to two 
recent works on SDL and formal privacy models: Statistical Confidentiality: 
Principles and Practice by George Duncan, Mark Elliot, and Juan-José 
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Salazar-González (2011), and “The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential 
Privacy” by Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth (2014).
A TAXONOMY OF THREATS TO CONFIDENTIALITY Confidentiality may be vio-
lated in many related ways. An identity disclosure occurs if the identity of 
a specific individual is completely revealed in the data. This can occur 
because a unique identifier is released or because the information released 
about a respondent is enough to uniquely identify him or her in the data. An 
attribute disclosure occurs when it is possible to deduce from the published 
data a specific confidential attribute of a given respondent.
Modern SDL and formal privacy systems treat disclosure risk probabi-
listically. From this perspective, the problem is not merely that published 
data might perfectly identify a respondent or his or her attributes. Rather, 
it is that the published data might allow a user to infer a respondent’s iden-
tity or attributes with high probability. This concept, known as inferential 
disclosure, was introduced by Tore Dalenius (1977) and formalized by 
Duncan and Diane Lambert (1986) in statistics, and by Shafi Goldwasser 
and Silvio Micali (1982) in computer science.
Suppose the published data are denoted Z. A confidential variable yi is 
associated with a specific respondent i. The prior beliefs of a user about the 
value of yi are represented by a probability distribution, p(yi), that reflects 
information from all other sources. Then p(yiZ) represents the updated—
posterior—beliefs of the user about the value of yi after the data Z are pub-
lished. An inferential disclosure has occurred if the posterior beliefs are too 
large relative to prior beliefs.
Our example of randomized response from section I.B provides intuition 
about inferential disclosure. The probability that the respondent will answer 
“yes” given that the truth is “yes” is 75 percent. The probability that the 
respondent will answer “yes” given that the truth is “no” is 25 percent. These 
two probabilities are entirely determined by the probability that the respon-
dent was asked the sensitive question and the probability that the answer to 
the innocuous question is “yes.” They do not depend on the unknown 
population probability of having committed a violent crime. The ratio 
of these two probabilities is the Bayes factor—the ratio of the posterior 
odds that the truth is “yes” versus “no” given the survey answer “yes” to 
the prior odds of “yes” versus “no.” The interviewer learns from a “yes” 
answer that the respondent is three times as likely as a random person to 
have committed a violent crime, and that is all the interviewer learns. Had 
the violent crime question been asked directly, the interviewer could have 
updated his posterior beliefs by a much larger factor—potentially infinite 
if the respondent answers truthfully.
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Moving forward, it is important to keep the concept of inferential disclo-
sure in mind for two reasons. First, it leads to a key intuition: It is impos-
sible to publish useful data without incurring some threat to confidentiality. 
A privacy protection scheme that provably eliminates all inferential 
disclosures is equivalent to a full encryption of the confidential data and 
therefore useless for analysis.3 Second, to be effective against inferential 
disclosure, certain SDL methods require that statistical agencies also 
conceal the details of their implementation. For example, with swapping, 
knowledge of the swap rate would increase inferential disclosure risk by 
improving the user’s knowledge of the full data publication process. We 
will argue later that researchers, and agencies, should prefer SDL methods 
whose details can be made publicly available.
II.C. SDL Methods for Microdata
SUPPRESSION Suppression is one of the most common forms of SDL. 
Suppression can be used to eliminate an entire record from the data or to 
eliminate an entire attribute. Record-level suppression is ignorable under 
the same assumptions that lead to ignorable missing data models in gen-
eral. However, if the suppression rule is based on data items deemed to be 
sensitive, then it is very unlikely that the data were suppressed at random. 
In that case, knowledge of the suppression rule along with auxiliary infor-
mation from the underlying microdata is extremely useful in assessing the 
effect of suppression on any specific application. Sometimes suppression is 
combined with imputation; this occurs when sensitive information is sup-
pressed and then replaced with an imputed value.
AGGREGATION Aggregation refers to the coarsening of values a vari-
able can take, or the combination of information from multiple variables. 
The canonical example is the Census Bureau’s practice of aggregating 
geographic units into Public-Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Likewise, 
data on occupation are often reported in broad aggregates. The aggrega-
tion levels are deliberately set in such a way that the number of individuals 
represented in the data have some combination of attributes that exceeds a 
certain threshold. Aggregation is what prevents a user from, say, looking 
up the income of a 42-year-old economist living in Washington, D.C. Other 
forms of aggregation are quite familiar to empirical researchers, such as 
topcoding income, and reporting income in bins rather than in levels. These 
3. Evfimievski, Gehrke, and Srikant (2003) and Dwork (2006) prove it is impossible to 
deliver full protection against inferential disclosures, using different, but related, formaliza-
tions of the posterior probabilities.
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methods are well understood by researchers, and their effects on empirical 
work have been carefully studied. In many cases, it is easy to determine 
whether aggregation is a problem for a particular research application; in 
such cases, one possible solution is to obtain access to the confidential, 
disaggregated data.
NOISE INFUSION Noise infusion is a method in which the underlying 
microdata are distorted using either additive or multiplicative noise. The 
infusion of noise is not generally ignorable. If applied correctly, noise infu-
sion can preserve conditional and unconditional means and covariances, but 
it always inflates variances and leads to attenuation bias in estimated regres-
sion coefficients and correlations among the attributes (Duncan, Elliot, and 
Salazar-González 2011, p. 113). To assess the effects for any particular 
application, researchers need to know which variables have been infused 
with noise along with information about any relevant parameters govern-
ing the distribution of noise. If such information is not published, it may 
be possible to infer the noise distribution from the public-use data if there 
are multiple releases of information based on the same underlying frame. 
We illustrate this possibility in our analysis of the public-use Quarterly 
Workforce Indicators (QWI), Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW), and County Business Patterns (CBP) data in section IV.B.
DATA SWAPPING Data swapping is the practice of switching the values of 
a selected set of attributes for one data record with the values reported in 
another record. The goal is to protect the confidentiality of sensitive values 
while maintaining the validity of the data for specific analyses. To imple-
ment swapping, the agency develops an index based on the probability that 
an individual record can be re-identified.4 Sensitive records are compared 
to “nearby” records on the basis of a few variables. If there is a match, the 
values of some or all of the other variables are swapped. Usually, the geo-
graphic identifiers are swapped, thus effectively relocating the records in 
each other’s location.
For example, in Athens, Georgia, there may be only one male household 
head with 10 children. If that man participates in the ACS and reports 
his income, it would be possible for anyone to learn his income by simply 
reading the unswapped ACS. To protect confidentiality, the entire data 
record can be swapped with the record of another household in a different 
geographic area with a similar income.
4. See Reiter (2005), Skinner and Holmes (1998), and Skinner and Shlomo (2008) for 
specifics on the risk indexes and Duncan, Elliot, and Salazar-González (2011, p. 114) for a 
review of historical uses of swapping.
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Swapping preserves the marginal distribution of the variables used to 
match the records at the cost of all joint and conditional distributions involv-
ing the swapped variables. The computer science community has frequently 
criticized this approach to confidentiality protection because it does not 
meet the “cryptography” standard: an encryption algorithm is provably 
secure when all details and parameters, except the encryption key, can 
be made public without compromising the algorithm. SDL algorithms 
like swapping are not provably effective when too many of their parameters 
are public. That is why the agencies do not publish them or release more 
than a few details of their swapping procedures.
The lack of published details is what makes input data swapping so insid-
ious for empirical research. Matching variables, the definition of “nearby,” 
and the rate at which sensitive and nonsensitive records are swapped can 
all affect the data analyses that use those variables, so parameter confiden-
tiality makes it difficult to analyze the effects of swapping. Furthermore, 
even restricted-access arrangements that permit use of the confidential data 
may still require the use of the swapped version, even if other SDL modi-
fications of the data have been removed. Some providers even destroy the 
unswapped data.
SYNTHETIC MICRODATA Synthetic microdata involve the publication of 
a data set with the same structure as the confidential data, in which 
the published data are drawn from the same data-generating process as 
the confidential data but some or all of the confidential data have been 
suppressed and imputed. The confidential data, Y, are generated by a 
model, p(Y q), parameterized by q. The synthetic microdata are drawn 
from p(Y˜ Y ), the posterior predictive distribution for the data process 
given the observed data, which has been estimated by the statistical 
agency.
When originally proposed by Roderick Little (1993) and Donald Rubin 
(1993), synthetic data methods mimicked procedures that already existed 
for missing-data problems. Synthetic data methods impose an explicit 
cost on the researcher—imputed data replacing actual data—in exchange 
for an explicit benefit, namely the correct estimation and inference proce-
dures that are available for the synthetic data. The Little–Rubin forms of 
synthetic data analysis are guaranteed to be SDL-aware. If the researcher’s 
hypothesis is among those for which correct inference procedures are avail-
able, then the synthetic data are provably analytically valid. John Abowd 
and Simon Woodcock (2001), Trivellore Raghunathan, Jerome Reiter, and 
Rubin (2003), and Reiter (2004) have refined the Little–Rubin methods, 
allowing them to be applied to complex survey data and combined with 
234 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2015
other missing data imputations. They have also shown that the class of 
hypotheses with provable analytical validity is limited by the models used 
to estimate p(Y˜ Y).
Synthetic data can only be used by themselves for certain types of 
research questions—those for which they are analytically valid. This set 
of hypotheses depends on the model used to generate the synthetic data. 
For example, if the confidential data are 10 discrete variables and the 
synthetic data are generated from a model that includes all possible inter-
actions of two of these variables, then any research question involving only 
two variables can be analyzed in a correct, SDL-aware manner from the 
synthetic data. The analyst does not need access to the confidential data. 
But no model involving three or more variables can be analyzed correctly 
from the synthetic data. Such models require that the analyst have access to 
the confidential data. When the model used to produce the synthetic data is 
publicly available, researchers can assess whether a given synthetic data set 
is appropriate for a specific question.
Synthetic data can also be used as a framework for the development of 
models, code, and hypotheses. For example, researchers can sometimes 
develop models using the synthetic data, which are public, and then run 
those models on the confidential data. These applications form part of a 
feedback loop in which external researchers help provide improvements to 
the synthetic data model. We discuss synthetic data and the feedback loop 
in more detail in section VI.A.
FORMAL PRIVACY MODELS Formal privacy models emerged from data-
base security and cryptography. The idea is to model the publication of data 
by the statistical agency using a randomized mechanism that answers statis-
tical questions after adding noise to the properly computed answer in the 
confidential data. This is known in SDL as output distortion. Breaches of 
privacy are modeled as a game between users, who try to make inferential 
disclosures from the published data, and the statistical agency, which tries 
to limit these disclosures.
Dwork (2006) and Dwork and others (2006) formalized the privacy 
protection associated with output-distortion SDL in a model called 
e-differential privacy. For economists, Ori Heffetz and Katrina Ligett 
(2014) provide a very accessible introduction. Dwork and Roth (2014), in 
section 3, use our running example of randomized response to character-
ize e-differential privacy. In e-differential privacy, the SDL must put an 
upper bound, e, on the Bayes factor. In our example, e = ln (Bayes factor 
bound) = ln 3 = 1.1. Bounding the Bayes factor implies that the maxi-
mum amount the interviewer can learn from a “yes” answer is that the 
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respondent (in our original example) is three times as likely as a random 
person in the population to have committed a violent crime.
With formal privacy-protected data publication systems, there are prov-
able limits to the amount of privacy loss that can be experienced in the 
population even under worst-case outcomes. These systems also have 
provable accuracy for a specific set of hypotheses. From a researcher per-
spective, then, formal privacy systems and synthetic data are very similar— 
only some hypotheses can be studied accurately, and these are deter-
mined by the statistical queries answered in the formal privacy model. For 
example, in a case where the confidential data are, once again, 10 discrete 
variables, and the formal privacy system publishes a protected version of 
every two-way marginal table, then, once again, any hypothesis involv-
ing only two variables can be studied correctly. Likewise, no hypotheses 
involving three or more variables can be studied correctly without addi-
tional privacy-protected publications. Whether these computations can be 
safely performed by the formal privacy system depends on whether any 
privacy budget remains. If the privacy budget has been exhausted by pub-
lishing all two-way tables, then no further analysis of the confidential data 
is permitted.
Synthetic data and formal privacy methods are converging. In the SDL 
literature, researchers now analyze the confidentiality protection provided 
by the synthetic data (Kinney and others 2011; Benedetto and Stinson 
2015; Machanavajjhala and others 2008). In the formal privacy literature, 
analysts may choose to publish the privacy-protected output as synthetic 
data—that is, in a format that allows an analyst to use the protected data 
as if they were the confidential data (Hardt, Ligett, and McSherry 2012). 
The analysis of synthetic data produced by a formal privacy system is not 
automatically SDL-aware. The researcher has to use the published features 
of the privacy model to correct the estimation and the inference.
II.D. SDL Methods for Tabular Data
Tabular data present confidentiality risks when the number of entities 
contributing to a particular cell in a table is small or the influence of a few 
of the entities on the value of the cell is large, such as for magnitudes like 
total payroll. A sensitive cell is one for which some function of the cell’s 
microdata falls above or below a threshold set by an agency-specific rule. 
The two most common methods for handling sensitive cells are forms of 
randomized rounding, which distorts the cell value and may distort other 
cells as well, and the more common method of suppression. An alternative 
to suppression is to build tables after adding noise to the input microdata.
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SUPPRESSION Suppression deletes the values for sensitive cells from 
the published data. From the outset, it was understood that primary 
suppression—not publishing easily identified data items—does not protect 
anything if an agency publishes the rest of the data, including summary 
statistics (Fellegi 1972). In such a case, users could infer the missing items 
from what was published. Agencies that rely on suppression for tabular data 
make complementary suppressions to reduce the probability that a user can 
infer the sensitive items from the published data.
Suppressions introduce a missing-data problem for researchers. Whether 
that missing-data problem is ignorable or not depends on the nature of the 
model being analyzed and the manner in which suppression is done. An 
analysis using geographical variation for identification will benefit from 
using data where industrial classifications were used for the complementary 
suppressions, whereas an analysis that uses industrial variation will benefit 
from using data where the complementary suppressions were made using 
geographical classifications. Ultimately, the preferences of the agency that 
chooses the complementary suppression strategy will determine which 
analyses have higher data quality. As with swap rates, agencies rarely pub-
lish details of their methods for choosing complementary suppressions.
INPUT DISTORTION Input distortion of the microdata is another method 
for protecting tabular data. Using this method, an agency distorts the value 
of some or all of the inputs before any publication tables are built, and then 
computes all, or almost all, of the cells using only the distorted data.
II.E. Current Practices in the U.S. Statistical System
The SDL methods in the decentralized U.S. statistical system are varied. 
The most thorough analysis of this topic is the one published by the Federal 
Committee on Statistical Methodology (FCSM), which is organized by the 
chief statistician of the United States in the Office of Management and 
Budget (Harris-Kojetin and others 2005). We summarize the key features 
of the FCSM report and, where possible, provide updated information on 
certain data products used extensively by economists. It is incumbent upon 
the researcher to read the relevant documentation and, if necessary, contact 
the data provider to obtain nonconfidential publications detailing how the 
data were collected and prepared for publication, including which methods 
of SDL were applied.
The goal of the FCSM report is to characterize best practices for SDL, 
and it contains a table presenting the methods employed by each agency 
to protect microdata and tabular data (Harris-Kojetin and others 2005, 
p. 53). As of 2005, the table shows, almost all federal agencies that published 
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microdata reported using some form of nonignorable, undiscoverable 
data perturbation. The Census Bureau’s stated policy is “for small popu-
lations or rare characteristics, noise may be added to identifying vari-
ables, data may be swapped, or an imputation applied to the characteristic” 
(Harris-Kojetin and others 2005, p. 40). Many other agencies, including the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and National Science Foundation (NSF), 
contract with the Census Bureau to conduct surveys and therefore use the 
same or similar guidelines for SDL. The National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) also reports using ad hoc perturbation of the microdata 
to prevent matching, including swapping and “suppress and impute” for 
sensitive data items.
In a recent technical report by Amy Lauger, Billy Wisniewski, and Laura 
McKenna (2014), the Census Bureau released up-to-date information 
on its SDL methods. In addition to information about discoverable SDL 
methods, like geographic thresholds and topcoding, the report describes 
in more detail how noise is added to microdata to protect confidentiality. 
Specifically, it states that “noise is added to the age variable for persons 
in households with 10 or more people,” and that “noise is also added to a 
few other variables to protect small but well-defined populations but we 
do not disclose those procedures” (Lauger, Wisniewski, and McKenna 
2014, p. 2).
This Census Bureau report also confirms that swapping is the primary 
SDL method used in the ACS and decennial censuses. The swapping 
method targets records that have high disclosure risk due to some com-
bination of rare attributes, such as racial isolation in a particular location. 
The records at risk are matched on the basis of an unnamed set of variables 
and swapped into a different geography. In the past few years, the Census 
Bureau has changed the set of items it uses to determine whether a record 
is at risk and should be swapped, and the swap rate has increased slightly. 
The Census Bureau performed an evaluation of the effects of swapping 
on the quality of published tabular statistics, but it has not published its 
evaluation results due to concerns that they might compromise the SDL 
procedures themselves.
One Census Bureau official whom we interviewed said the rate of swap-
ping is low relative to the rate at which data are edited for other purposes. 
Furthermore, the official said, swapping is applied to cases that are extreme 
outliers on some particular combination of variables. Without getting more 
precise, the official conveyed that swapping, while potentially of consider-
able concern, may have substantially less effect on economic research than, 
say, missing-data imputation.
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Within the last 10 years the Census Bureau has also begun produc-
ing data based on more modern SDL methods. The Quarterly Workforce 
Indicators are protected using an input noise infusion method that, among 
other features, eliminates the need for cell suppression in count tables. 
The Census Bureau also offers synthetic microdata from the linked SIPP/
SSA/IRS data, the Longitudinal Business Database, and the Longitudinal 
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Origin-Destination Employment 
Statistics (LODES).5
III. How SDL Affects Common Research Designs
In this section, we demonstrate how to apply the concepts of ignorable 
and nonignorable SDL in common applied settings. In most cases, SDL 
is nonignorable, and researchers therefore need to know some properties 
of the SDL model that was applied to their data. When the SDL model 
is not known, it may still be discoverable in the manner introduced in 
section I.A.
III.A. Estimating Population Proportions with Noise Infusion
This example is motivated by the SDL procedure that is used to mask 
ages in the Census 2000, ACS, and CPS microdata files. Although the mis-
application of the procedure has been corrected for Census 2000 and ACS, 
current versions of the CPS for the mid-2000s may still be affected by the 
error, and have not been reissued. See the online appendix, section B, for 
more details.
Suppose the confidential data contain a binary variable (such as gender) 
and a multicategory discrete variable (such as age). We are interested in 
estimation and inference for the age-specific gender distribution, where b, 
the conditional probability of being male given age, is the parameter of 
interest. When age has been subjected to SDL, using published age to 
compute these conditional probabilities will lead to problems. The esti-
mated probability of being male conditional on age is affected by the SDL, 
even though the gender variable was not itself altered by the SDL.
Using the generalized randomized response structure, suppose that 
we know the probability that the published age data are unaltered. With 
probability r, the observed male/female value comes from the true age 
category. With the complementary probability, the observed outcome is a 
5. See for example U.S. Census Bureau (2013a, 2013b, 2015).
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binary random variable with expected value µ ≠ b. For example, µ might 
be the average value of the proportion male for all age categories at risk to 
be changed by the SDL model. In any case, µ is unknown.
Equation B.16 in the online appendix shows that if we ignore the 
SDL, the conditional probability estimator and its variance are biased. 
An SDL-aware estimator for the conditional probability of being male for 
a given age is bˆ = [z_1 - (1 - r) µ]/r, where z_1 is the estimated sample 
proportion of males of the chosen age. The estimator for the conditional 
proportion of interest bˆ is confounded by the two SDL parameters, except 
in the special case that r = 1, which implies that no SDL was applied to the 
published age data. If all of the observations have been subjected to SDL, 
then bˆ is undefined, and the expected value of z_1 is just µ. In the starkest 
possible terms, the estimator in equation B.16 is hopelessly underidentified 
in the absence of information about r and µ.
If r and µ are not known, they may still be discoverable if the analyst has 
access to estimates of conditional probabilities like b from an alternative 
source. See the online appendix, section B, for more details of the appli-
cation to the Census 2000 and ACS PUMS that generalizes the analysis in 
Alexander, Davern, and Stevenson (2010). This procedure can be used 
to discover the SDL in any data set, for example the CPS, for which alter-
native reliable published estimates of the gender-specific age distribution 
are available.
The SDL process is still underidentified if we consider only a single 
outcome like the gender-age distribution, but there are quite a few other 
binary outcomes that could also be studied, conditional on age—for exam-
ple, marital status, race, and ethnicity. The differences between Census 2000 
estimates of the proportion married at age 65 and older and their comparable 
Census 2000 PUMS estimates have exactly the same functional form as 
online appendix equation B.17 with exactly the same SDL parameters. 
Since these proportions condition on the same age variable, all the other 
outcomes that also have an official Census 2000 or ACS published pro-
portion can be used to estimate the unknown SDL parameters. The identi-
fying assumptions are (i) that all proportions are conditioned on the same 
noisy age variable, and (ii) that the noisy age variable can be reasonably 
modeled as randomized-response noise. We implement a similar method in 
section IV.B.
III.B. Estimating Regression Models
We next consider the effect of SDL on linear regression models. First, we 
analyze SDL applied to the dependent variable, assuming that the agency 
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replaces sensitive values with model-based imputed values. This form of 
SDL is nonignorable for parameter estimation and inference. Parameter 
estimates will be attenuated and standard errors will be underestimated. 
Furthermore, this form of SDL is not discoverable, except when there are 
two data releases from the same frame that use different, independent SDL 
processes.
Our analysis draws on the work of Barry Hirsch and Edward Schumacher 
(2004) and Christopher Bollinger and Hirsch (2006), who study the closely 
related problem of bias from missing-data imputation in the CPS. Respon-
dents to the CPS commonly fail to provide answers to certain questions. 
In the published data, the missing values are imputed semi-parametrically, 
conditional on a set of variables. Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) observe 
that if union status is not in the conditioning set for the imputation model, 
the union wage gap will be underestimated when using imputed and non-
imputed values in a regression of log wages on union status. This bias 
is exacerbated by using additional controls. The result occurs because if 
union status is not in the imputation model’s conditioning set, then some 
union workers are imputed nonunion wages, and some nonunion workers 
are imputed union wages. Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) show that these 
results hold very generally.
There are two key differences in our approach. First, assessing bias from 
missing-data imputation is feasible because the published data include an 
indicator variable that flags which values were reported and which were 
imputed. With SDL, the affected records and variables are not flagged. 
Second, in the SDL application, the published data can be imputed using 
the distribution of the confidential data. This means that the agency does 
not have to use an ignorable missing-data model when doing imputations 
for SDL. When imputing actual missing data, which was the subject of 
the Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) paper, the agency does assume that the 
missing data were generated by an ignorable inclusion model. The direct 
consequence is that the model used to impute the suppressed values can 
be conditioned on all of the confidential data, including the rule that deter-
mines whether an item will be suppressed. More succinctly, the analysis 
below demonstrates the effect of using an imputation model (or swapping 
rule) that does not contain a regressor of interest, and thus is not conflated 
with any bias that could arise from nonrandomness of the suppression rule.
SDL APPLIED TO THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE The model of interest is the 
function E[yi1yi2] = a + yi2 b. In the published data, sensitive values of 
the outcome variable yi1 are suppressed and imputed. The variable γi indi-
cates whether yi1 is suppressed and imputed. When γi = 1, the confidential 
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data are published without modification. When γi = 0, the value for yi1 is 
replaced with an imputed value, zi1, which is drawn from pY1X (yi1xi, γi = 0), 
the conditional distribution of the outcome variable given xi among sup-
pressed observations. The conditioning information used in the imputation 
model, xi = fI (yi2), is a function fI that maps all of the available conditioning 
information in yi2 into a vector of control variables xi.
The simplest example is a model in which xi consists of a strict subset 
of variables in yi2. For example, in Hirsch and Schumacher (2004), yi2 is 
a set of conditioning variables that includes an indicator for union mem-
bership, and xi is the same set of conditioning variables but excluding 
the union membership indicator. Like the suppression model, the features 
of the imputation model, including the function fI, are known only to the 
agency and not to the analyst.
The released data are zi1 = yi1 if γi = 1 and zi1 ~ pY1X(y1ixi, γi = 0) otherwise. 
For the other variables, z2i = y2i. The marginal probability that the exact 
confidential data are published is Pr [γi = 1] = r. So the suppression rate is 
(1 - r), an exact analogue of the rate at which irrelevant data replace good 
data in randomized response. Finally, note that nothing in this specification 
requires independence between the decision to suppress, γi, and the data 
values, yi1 and yi2.
The effects of statistical disclosure limitation in this context are generi-
cally nonignorable except for two unusual cases. If no observations are 
suppressed (r = 1), then the SDL is ignorable because it is irrelevant. In 
the more interesting case, the characteristics, xi, perfectly predict z2i, and 
the SDL model is also ignorable for consistent estimation of b. This case is 
interesting because it occurs when the agency conditions on all covariates of 
interest, y2i, when imputing y1i, and then releases y2i without any additional 
SDL. Even in this latter case, while the SDL is ignorable for consistent 
estimation of b, it is not ignorable for inference. The SDL model introduces 
variance that is not included in the standard estimator for the variance of bˆ.
The effects of SDL on estimation and inference could be assessed 
and corrected if the analyst knew two key properties of the SDL model: 
(i) the suppression rate, (1 - r) = Pr [γi = 0]; and (ii) the set of character-
istics used to impute the suppressed observations, xi. At present, almost 
nothing is known in the research community about either characteristic of 
the SDL models used in many data sets. See online appendix, section C.1, 
for details.
SDL APPLIED TO A SINGLE REGRESSOR If SDL is applied to a single regres-
sor rather than to the dependent variable, the conclusions of the analysis 
remain the same, as long as the imputation model does not perfectly predict 
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the omitted regressor. Curiously, if the regression model only has a single 
regressor and the conditioning information is the same, the bias from SDL 
is identical whether the SDL is applied to the regressor or to the depen-
dent variable. If there are multiple regressors, with SDL applied to a single 
regressor, the SDL introduces bias in all regressors. The model setup and 
nature of the bias are derived explicitly in the online appendix, section C.2.
III.C. Estimating Regression Discontinuity Models
Regression discontinuity (RD) and regression kink (RK) models can 
be seriously compromised when SDL has been applied to the running vari-
able. To illustrate some of these issues, we consider a design from Guido 
Imbens and Thomas Lemieux (2008). This analysis is intended to guide 
economists, who can perform our simplified SDL-aware analysis as part of 
the specification testing for a general RD.
MODEL SETUP Modeling the unobservable latent outcomes is intrinsic 
to the RD analysis. We incorporate the usual counterfactual data process 
inherent in the RD design directly into the data model. As Imbens and 
Lemieux (2008) note, this is a Rubin Causal Model (Rubin 1974; Holland 
1986; Imbens and Rubin 2015). The simplest data model, corresponding to 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008, pp. 616–19), has three continuous variables 
and one discrete variable whose conditional distribution is degenerate in 
the RD design and nondegenerate in the fuzzy RD (FRD) design. The latent 
data process consists of four variables with the following definitions: wi (0) 
= untreated outcome, wi (1) = treated outcome, ti = treatment indicator, and 
ri = RD running variable. The confidential data vector has the experimental 
design structure, Y = (wi*, ti, ri) where wi* = wi (ti).
Our interest centers on the conditional expectations in the population 
data model E[wi(0)ri] = f1(ri) and E[wi(1)ri] = f2(ri), where f1(ri) and f2(ri) 
are continuous functions of the running variable, ri. The parameter of inter-
est is the average treatment effect at t:
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NONIGNORABLE SDL IN THE RUNNING VARIABLE We focus on the setting 
where SDL is only applied to the RD running variable and its associated 
indicator. The published data vector is Z = (wi*, ti, zi). The published run-
ning variable is sampled from a distribution that depends on the true value: 
zi ~ pZR (zi ri). We assume the distribution pZR (zi ri) is the randomized 
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response mixture model, a generalization of simple randomized response 
described in the online appendix, section D.1. The SDL process depends 
on two parameters: r, the probability that the confidential value of the run-
ning variable is released without added noise, and d, the standard deviation 
of a mean zero noise term added to the running variable when subjected 
to SDL.
If the agency publishes its SDL values r = r0 and d = d0 and the true 
RD is strict, then the analyst can correct the strict RD estimator directly 
using
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Clearly, this implies that the uncorrected estimate is attenuated toward 
zero. Intuitively, the introduction of noise into the running variable con-
verts the strict RD to a fuzzy RD, with E[tizi, r0, d0] playing the role of 
the “compliance status” function. For details, see the online appendix, 
section D.2.
When the true RD is strict, the SDL is discoverable from the compli-
ance function even if the agency has not released the SDL parameters. 
The researcher can use the fact that the compliance function g(zi) =
1 z zi i( )[ ] ( )r ≥ t + - r Φ - td1 . The fuzzy RD estimator is
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When the noise addition is independent of the outcome variables (as is 
the case here), the change in the probability of treatment at the discontinuity 
point, t, is equal to the share of undistorted observations, r0. When r = 1, 
there has been no SDL, and both estimators yield the conventional sharp 
RD estimate. A similar analysis shows that a sharp RK design becomes a 
fuzzy RK design (Card and others 2012) in the presence of SDL. As in 
the case of linear regression, it is still necessary to model the extra variabil-
ity from the SDL to get correct estimates of the variance of the estimated 
RD parameter.
IMPLICATIONS OF SDL IN THE RUNNING VARIABLE FOR FUZZY RD MODELS If 
generalized randomized-response SDL is applied to the running variable, 
then the SDL is ignorable for parameter estimation when using a fuzzy 
RD design. The FRD compliance function must be augmented with the 
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contribution from SDL. When the running variable is distorted with nor-
mally distributed noise, as we have assumed, there is no point mass any-
where, and hence no discontinuity in the probability of treatment at the 
discontinuity that is due to the SDL. The claim that the SDL is ignorable for 
estimation of the treatment effect in the fuzzy RD design follows because 
the only discontinuity in the estimated compliance function is entirely due 
to the discontinuity in the true running variable. (See the online appendix, 
section D.2.1, for details.) Imbens and Lemieux (2008) show that the 
instrumental variable (IV) estimator that uses the RD as an exclusion 
restriction is formally equivalent to the fuzzy RD estimator, so the SDL is 
also ignorable for consistent estimation in this case as well.
Whether or not the SDL is ignorable for consistent estimation, it is never 
ignorable for inference. The estimated standard errors of the RD and FRD 
treatment effects must be adjusted.
In some applications, the treatment indicator is not observed and must 
be proxied by the discontinuity point, around which the RD is strict. If 
the treatment indicator is not observed and SDL has been applied to the 
running variable, only the sharp RD estimator is available, and it will 
be attenuated by a factor r. Nothing can be done in this setting without 
auxiliary information about the SDL model.
NONIGNORABLE SDL IN OTHER PARTS OF THE RD DESIGN When SDL is applied 
to the dependent variable rather than the running variable, the situation 
is more complicated. We refer to our analysis of regression models in sec-
tion III.B. SDL applied to the dependent variable will lead to attenuation 
of the estimated treatment effect unless all relevant variables, including 
the running variable and its interaction with the discontinuity point, are 
included in the SDL model for the dependent variable. Hence, SDL applied 
to the dependent variable is more likely to cause problems for RD than for 
conventional linear regression models, since the variation around the dis-
continuity point is unlikely to be included in the agency’s imputation or 
swapping algorithms.
CONSEQUENCES OF DATA COARSENING FOR SDL The ignorability of SDL in 
some circumstances was anticipated in the work of Daniel Heitjan and 
Rubin (1991), which considers the problem of inference when the pub-
lished data are coarsened. Their application was to reporting errors where, 
for instance, individuals round their hours to salient, whole numbers. The 
same model is relevant to those types of microdata SDL that aggregate 
attribute categories, like occupations or geographies, and to topcoding.
David Lee and David Card (2008) consider the consequences of microdata 
coarsening for RD designs. For example, if ages are coarsened into years, the 
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RD design in which age is the running variable will group observations near 
the boundary with those further from the boundary, violating the required 
assumption that the running variable is continuous around the treatment 
threshold. Once again, depending on the type of RD design, when SDL is 
accomplished through coarsening of the running variable, it is not ignor-
able. An analysis that uses the coarsened running variable with a standard 
RD estimator may be biased and understate standard errors. As in Heitjan 
and Rubin (1991), Lee and Card (2008) establish conditions under which 
a grouped-data estimator provides a valid way to handle coarsened data. 
This method is agnostic about the cause of the grouping and is therefore 
SDL-aware by construction.
III.D. Estimating Instrumental Variable Models
We consider simple instrumental variable models with a single endoge-
nous explanatory variable, a single instrument, and no additional regressors. 
Except where indicated, the intuition for these examples carries through to a 
more general setting with multiple instruments and controls.
The confidential data model of interest is the standard IV system
y t
t z
i i i
i i i
= κ + γ + e
= φ + d + η
where yi is the outcome of interest, ti is a scalar variable that may be cor-
related with the structural residual ei, and zi is a scalar variable that can 
serve as an instrument. That is, zi is uncorrelated with ei and d ≠ 0. We 
assume the SDL described in section III.B is applied to either the depen-
dent variable, the endogenous regressor, or the instrument.
With this simplified setup, the IV estimator γˆIV = bˆ RF/dˆ, where bˆ RF, is 
the parameter estimate from the reduced form equation yi = a + bzi + vi. We 
apply the results in section III.B. First, if SDL is applied to the dependent 
variable, then the point estimate of γ will be attenuated. This is an immediate 
consequence of the fact that plim bˆ  ≤ b, while plim dˆ = d. Second, by paral-
lel reasoning, if SDL is applied to the endogenous regressor, then the point 
estimate of γ will be exaggerated. In this case, plim bˆ  = b, but plim dˆ ≤ d. 
This result implies that IV models may overstate the coefficient of interest 
when SDL is applied to the endogenous regressor. It is also not possible to 
use IV to correct for SDL in this case.
Finally, somewhat surprisingly, SDL is ignorable when applied to the 
instrument. In this particular model, with a single instrument and no regres-
sors, the attenuation term is the same in the first-stage and reduced form, 
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and therefore cancels out of the ratio bˆ RF/dˆ . We caution, however, that this 
ignorability does not extend to the case where there are additional exog-
enous regressors. In summary, our analysis suggests that blank-and-impute 
SDL is generally nonignorable for instrumental variables estimation and 
inference.
IV. Analysis of Official Tables
Tabular or aggregate data are the primary public output of most official 
statistical systems. Most agencies offer a technical manual that provides 
an extensive description of how the microdata inputs were transformed 
into the publication tables. These manuals rarely, if ever, include an assess-
ment of the effects of the SDL, and we could find no examples of manuals 
that did among the federal statistical agencies. When an agency releases 
measures of precision for aggregate data, these measures do not include 
variation due to SDL.
There are three key forms of SDL applied to tabular summaries. All fed-
eral agencies rely on primary and complementary suppression as the main 
SDL method. When an alternative SDL method is used, the most common 
ones add noise to the underlying input microdata or to the prerelease tabu-
lated estimates. For household-based inputs, most agencies also perform 
some form of swapping before preparing tabular summaries. For business-
based inputs, we are not aware of any SDL system that uses swapping.
IV.A. Directly Tabulating Published Microdata
An alternative to using published tabulations is to tabulate from pub-
lished microdata files. This is usually not an option for business data, which 
form the bulk of our examples in this section, but it may be an option for 
household data. We explore some of the pitfalls of doing custom tabula-
tions in the online appendix, section E.3. Researchers should use caution 
when making tabulations from published microdata if the subpopulations 
being studied are often suppressed in the official tables. The presence of 
suppression usually signals a data quality problem.
IV.B. Suppression versus Noise Infusion
WHEN SUPPRESSION IS NONIGNORABLE Tabular suppression rules identify 
cells that are too heavily influenced by a few observations. The conse-
quences for research are profound when those few observations are the 
focus of a particular study or the cause of a very inconvenient complemen-
tary suppression. It is not surprising that detailed data about the upper 
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0.25 percent of the income distribution are almost all suppressed by the 
Statistics of Income Division of the IRS. If a study focuses on unusual 
subpopulations, dealing with suppression is a normal part of the research 
design.
The most common form of suppression bias occurs when an analyst 
is assembling data at a given aggregation level, such as county level by 
four-digit NAICS6 industry group from the BLS’s Census of Employ-
ment and Wages frame. Between 60 and 80 percent of the published 
cells will have missing data. These data cannot reasonably be missing at 
random (ignorably missing) because the rule used to determine if those 
data could be published depends upon the values of the missing data. 
The problem compounds as covariates from other sources are added to 
the analysis.
Formally, SDL suppression is never ignorable. The probability that 
a cell is suppressed depends on the values of its component microdata 
records. Surprisingly, there is considerable resistance to replacing sup-
pression with SDL methods that infuse deliberate noise. Noise-infusion 
SDL, as applied in the QWI, allows for the elimination of cell suppres-
sion and therefore eliminates bias from missing data. The trade-off is an 
increase in variance of all table entries, including those that would not 
be suppressed.
Perhaps the resistance to replacing suppression with noise-infusion 
arises because the bias from suppression is buried in a missing-data prob-
lem that most applied studies address with ad hoc methods: (i) analyze 
the published data as though the suppressions were ignorable, or (ii) do 
the analysis at a more aggregated level (say, NAICS subsector rather than 
NAICS industry group). These approaches are generally not as good as 
what could be accomplished with the same data if the cause were acknowl-
edged and addressed.
A better solution, which is still ad hoc, is to use the frame variable 
to allocate the values of higher-level aggregates into the missing lower-
level observations for the same variable. For example, in the QWI the 
frame variable is quarterly payroll—it is never suppressed at any level 
of aggregation—and in the QCEW and CBP the frame variable is the 
number of establishments, which is also never suppressed in these pub-
lications. The analyst can proportionally allocate the three-digit industrial 
aggregate employment, say, using the four-digit proportions of the frame 
6. North American Industry Classification System.
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variable as weights. This can be done in a sophisticated manner so that 
none of the observed original data are overwritten or contradicted by this 
imputation. For example, it can be done by only imputing the values of 
the four-digit employment that were actually suppressed and respecting 
the published three-digit employment totals for the sum of all four-digit 
industries within that total. This solution at least acknowledges that the 
suppression bias is nonignorable. The values for the higher-level aggre-
gates contain some information about the suppressed values. Allocations 
based on the frame variable assume that the distribution of every variable 
with missing data across the entire population is the same as the distribu-
tion of the frame variable.
The analyst can do better still. The best solution for any given analysis 
is to combine the model of interest with a model for the suppressed data. 
Bayesian hierarchical models, like the ones we used in this paper, work 
well. Software tools for specifying and implementing such models are read-
ily available. The complete model will properly account for the nonrandom 
pattern of the missing data, will incorporate prior information about the sup-
pression rule that can be used for identification, and account for the addi-
tional uncertainty introduced by suppression. See Scott Holan and others 
(2010) for a specific application to BLS data.
WHEN NOISE INFUSION MAKES THE SDL NONIGNORABLE Applying SDL by 
input noise infusion dramatically reduces the amount of suppression in the 
publication data. Since we are going to illustrate many of the features of 
these systems in the example in section V, we devote our attention here to 
the basic nonignorable features of input noise infusion.
Input noise infusion models were first proposed by Timothy Evans, 
Laura Zayatz, and John Slanta (1998). The noise models they proposed are 
constructed so that the expectation of the noisy aggregate, given the con-
fidential aggregate, equals the confidential aggregate. This is the sense in 
which these measures are unbiased. In addition, as the number of entities 
in a cell (usually business establishments) gets large, the variance of the 
aggregate that is due to noise infusion vanishes. This is the sense in which 
these measures add variance to the published data in exchange for reducing 
suppression bias. Finally, the noise itself is usually generated from an inde-
pendent, identically distributed random variable, so the joint distribution of 
the confidential data and the input noise factors into two independent dis-
tributions. Thus, SDL using input noise infusion can sometimes be ignor-
able for estimating the parameter of interest, but it will generally not be 
ignorable when trying to form a confidence interval around that estimate. 
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Because the noise process affects the posterior distribution of most param-
eters of interest, it is generally not ignorable.
Fortunately, agencies have been much more open about the processes 
used to produce publication tables from noise-infused inputs. A data-quality 
variable generally indicates whether the published value suffers from sub-
stantial infused noise. These flags are based on the absolute percentage error 
in the published value compared to the confidential value. It turns out, as 
we will see below, that they also sometimes release enough information to 
estimate the variance of the noise process itself, which is the SDL parameter 
that plays the role of the randomized-response “true data” probability. When 
the variance of the noise-infusion process goes to zero, the SDL becomes 
ignorable for all analyses, if no other SDL replaces it.
V. SDL Discovery in Published Tables
In this section, we show that it is possible to use information from three 
data sets released from very similar frames to conduct complete SDL-
aware analyses. These data sets are the QWI, the QCEW, and the CBP. 
The key insight is that each data set applies a different SDL method to 
the same confidential microdata. The variation across the published data 
facilitates discovery of the SDL process. First, it is possible to directly 
infer a key unpublished variance term from the QWI noise infusion 
model. This variance term can then be used to correct SDL-generated 
estimation bias. Second, we argue that the QCEW and CBP data can be 
used as instruments to correct SDL-induced measurement error in analy-
sis based on the QWI.
V.A. Overview of the QWI, QCEW, and CBP Data Sets
The QWI is a collection of 32 employment and earnings statistics pro-
duced by the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program at the 
U.S. Census Bureau. It is based on state Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
system records integrated with information on worker and workplace char-
acteristics. Workplace characteristics are linked from the QCEW micro-
data. The frame for employers and workplaces is the universe of QCEW 
records, including both the employer report and the separate workplace 
reports. A QCEW workplace is an establishment in the QWI data. Essen-
tially, the same QCEW inputs are used by the BLS to publish its Census 
of Employment and Wages (CEW) quarterly series on employment and 
total payroll. (In what follows, the acronym QCEW is reserved for the 
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inputs and publications of the BLS in the CEW series.) CBP data sets are 
also published by the Census Bureau from inputs based on its employer 
Business Register.
While the QWI, QCEW, and CBP use closely related sources to pub-
lish statistics by employer characteristics, they apply different methods for 
SDL. The QWI and CBP distort the establishment-level microdata using a 
multiplicative noise model and publish the aggregated totals. The QCEW 
aggregates the undistorted confidential establishment-level microdata and 
then suppresses sensitive cells with enough complementary suppressions 
of nonsensitive cells to allow publication of most table margins.
V.B. Published Aggregates from the QWI, QCEW, and CBP
We give just enough detail here so that the reader can see how the Cen-
sus Bureau and BLS form the aggregates for the quarterly payroll variables 
that we will use to illustrate the consequences of universal noise infusion 
for SDL. (More details are in the online appendix, section F.)
Tabular aggregates are formed over a classification k = 1, . . . , K that 
partitions the universe of establishments into K mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive cells W(k)t. These partitions have detailed geographic and indus-
trial dimensions. For all three data sources, geography is coded using FIPS7 
county codes. Industrial classifications are NAICS sectors, subsectors, and 
industry groups. The tabular magnitudes are computed by aggregating the 
values over the establishments in the group k. For the QWI, in the absence 
of SDL, the total quarterly payroll Wjt for establishment j in group k and 
quarter t would be estimated by8
W Wk t jt
j k t
∑( ) =( )
∈W( )
2 .
For the QCEW, an identical formula uses total quarterly payroll, as 
measured by W jt (QCEW) and for CBP, the quarterly payroll variable would be 
W jt (CBP). Published aggregates from the QWI are computed using multiplica-
tive noise factors dj that have mean zero and constant variance. (More 
details are in the online appendix, section G.) The published quarterly pay-
roll is computed as
W Wk t j jt
j k t
∑( ) = d( )
∈W( )
p3 ,
7. Federal Information Processing Standard.
8. We abstract from the weight that QWI uses to benchmark certain state-level aggre-
gates. Formulas including weights are in the online appendix, section H.
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where we have adopted the convention of tagging the post-SDL value 
with an asterisk. The same noise factor is used to aggregate total quarterly 
payroll and all other QWI variables. Total quarterly payroll is never sup-
pressed in the QWI. The number of establishments in a cell is not pub-
lished. If, and only if, a cell has a published value of W*, then there is at 
least one establishment in that cell.
The published QCEW payroll aggregate is exactly the output of equa-
tion 2 using QCEW inputs. The published QCEW total quarterly payroll 
might be missing due to suppression. The QCEW data use item-specific 
suppression. Payroll might be suppressed when employment is not, and 
vice versa.
The CBP total quarterly payroll is exactly the output of equation 3 with 
CBP-specific inputs, including the noise factor. As with the QWI data, the 
same noise factor is used for all the input variables from a particular estab-
lishment. The published CBP aggregates have some SDL suppressions and 
can therefore be missing. The number of establishments in a cell is never 
suppressed, nor is the size distribution of employers.
V.C. Regression Models with Nonignorable SDL
The noise infusion in QWI may be nonignorable. Univariate regres-
sion of a variable from another data set onto a QWI aggregate provides a 
simple illustration, which we summarize here. (See the online appendix, 
section E.4, for details.)
The model of interest is appendix equation E.26, the regression of a 
county-level outcome Y(k)t from a non-QWI source on QWI quarterly payroll 
in the county W*. The dependent variable can be subjected to SDL as long 
as it is independent of the QWI SDL, as would be the case if the dependent 
variable were computed by the BLS or the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The published aggregate data are the [Y(k)t, W*(k)t]. The undistorted 
values, W(k)t, are confidential.
The probability limit of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator for 
the regression coefficient on b based on using the published data is appen-
dix equation E.27, and the asymptotic bias ratio is appendix equation E.28. 
The bias due to SDL depends on the product of two factors: the variance 
of the noise-infusion process and the expected Herfindahl index for payroll 
within aggregate k, as derived in the online appendix, section E.5. If either 
of these factors is zero, there is no bias in estimation. But the expected Her-
findahl index is data, so we cannot make prior restrictions on that compo-
nent. This leaves only the SDL noise variance. Clearly, the noise infusion is 
nonignorable in this setting.
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One option is to correct the bias analytically. If the noise variance is 
known or can be estimated, the bias can be corrected directly. An unbiased 
estimator for E[W(k)t]2 is available from E[W*(k)t]2 once the variance of the 
multiplicative noise factor, V[dj], is known, after which it only remains to 
recover V[W(k)t] from the definition of V[W*(k)t].
The second possibility is to find instruments. Any instrument, Z(k)t, cor-
related with W(k)t and uncorrelated with the SDL noise infusion process, 
will work, as shown in appendix equation E.29. In the QWI setting, there 
are three natural candidates for such instruments: (i) data from the QCEW 
for the same cell; (ii) data from CBP from the same cell; and (iii) data from 
neighboring cells (geographies or industries) in the QWI.
Data from QCEW for the same cell are based on the same administra-
tive record system. QWI tabulates its measures from the UI wage records. 
QCEW tabulates from the associated ES-202 workplace report. The total 
payroll measure has an identical statutory definition on both administrative 
record systems for the state’s Unemployment Insurance. Data for CBP are 
tabulated from the Census Bureau’s employer Business Register. Payroll 
and employment come from the employer federal tax filings, and the pay-
roll measured from this IRS source has a very similar statutory definition 
as compared to the definition used by QWI and QCEW. Finally, QWI data 
from nearby geographies or industries (depending on the aggregate repre-
sented by k) should be correlated with the QWI variable in the regression 
because they are based on the same administrative record system reports.
By construction, all of these instruments are uncorrelated with the SDL-
induced noise in the right-hand side of equation E.26. In the case of QCEW 
or CBP data, any SDL-induced noise (CBP) or suppression bias (QCEW 
and CBP) in the instrument is independent of the noise in QWI. How-
ever, if many of the cells in the tabulation of the instrument are suppressed, 
that will affect the validity of the instrument, as we analyzed in section 
IV.B. When there are many suppressions in QCEW or CBP for the partition 
under study, data from the neighboring QWI cells can be used to complete 
the set of instruments.
Perhaps surprisingly, the input noise infusion to the QWI does not bias 
parameter estimates if the dependent and independent variables all come 
from QWI. Once drawn, the establishment-level noise factors are the same 
across variables and over time. Therefore, the variance from noise infu-
sion affects all variables in exactly the same manner, factors out of the 
OLS moment equations, and then cancels. The same feature of the QWI 
also leads the time-series properties of the data to be preserved after noise 
infusion. We note that this feature is unique to the QWI method of noise 
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infusion, where the noise process is fixed over time for each cross-sectional 
unit. It does not hold for other forms of noise infusion, such as the one used 
by CBP.
V.D. Estimating the Variance Contribution of SDL for the QWI
It is possible to recover the variance of the noise factor V[dj], which is 
needed to correct directly for bias in the univariate and multivariate regres-
sion examples using the QWI. The details of this estimation process are 
presented in the online appendix, section E.5.
Our leverage in this analysis comes from the fact that QWI and QCEW 
use identical frames (QCEW establishments). Hence, we can use W (k)t(QCEW) 
as the instrument for W(k)t, as long as it has not been suppressed too often. 
Furthermore, we can use W (k)t(QCEW), which is published at the county level as 
an instrument for any subcategory of QWI payroll, for example payroll of 
females ages 55–64, even though no exact analogue is published in QCEW.
Although the data come from a different administrative record system, 
the concepts underlying the CBP payroll variable are very similar to both 
the QWI and QCEW inputs. The SDL system used for CBP data is very 
similar to the one used for QWI, but the random noise in CBP is indepen-
dent of the random noise in QWI. Therefore, CBP data can also be used 
as instruments, and they are suppressed far less often than QCEW data. The 
formulas for recovering both systems’ SDL parameters are in the online 
appendix, section E.5.
V.E. Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the estimates of the equation used to recover the SDL 
parameters fitted using matched QWI and QCEW data for the first quar-
ters of 2006 through 2011 by ordinary least squares. Table 2 fits the same 
functions using mixed-effect models.9 The equations are fitted for state-
level aggregations, where the error in both the employment and payroll 
magnitudes is mitigated by the benchmarking, county-level aggregations, 
where the agreement in the workplace codes for county is most likely to 
be strong, and county by NAICS sector-level aggregations, where there is 
greater scope for differences between the coding of the microdata in QWI 
and QCEW.
Both tables give very similar estimates for V[d] whether we use payroll 
or employment as the basis. This suggests that the bias in estimating V[d] 
9. By the construction of the noise-infusion process for QWI, the design of the random 
effects is orthogonal to ln N(k)t.
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from using proxies for the Herfindahl index is either minimal or uncorre-
lated between employment and payroll. Either way, we are able to estimate 
with reasonable precision the range of possibilities for V[d], and these indi-
cate that the noise infusion does not create a very substantial bias or inflate 
estimated variances substantially.
VI. The Frontiers of SDL
In this section we discuss the relationship between synthetic data and vali-
dation servers, the nature and limits of formal privacy systems, and the 
analysis of confidential data in enclaves.
VI.A. Analysis of Synthetic Data
We defined synthetic data in section II. Here we discuss the tight rela-
tionship between synthetic data systems and validation servers, a method 
of improving the accuracy of synthetic data that links the user commu-
nity and the data providers directly. In a synthetic data feedback loop, the 
agency releases synthetic microdata to the research community. Research-
ers analyze the synthetic data as if they were public-use versions of the 
confidential data using SDL-aware analysis software. When the analysis 
of the synthetic data is complete, the researchers may request a validation, 
which is performed by the data providers on the actual confidential data. 
The results of the validation are subjected to conventional SDL and then 
released to the researcher as public-use data. The data provider then inven-
tories these analyses and uses them to improve the analytical validity of the 
synthetic data in the next release by testing new versions of the synthetic 
data on the models in its inventory.
The Census Bureau has two active feedback-loop, synthetic-data sys-
tems: the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Synthetic 
Beta (SSB) and the Synthetic Longitudinal Business Database (SynLBD).10 
The SSB provides synthetic data for all panels of the SIPP linked to longi-
tudinal W-2 data. SynLBD is a synthetic version of selected variables and 
all observations from the confidential Longitudinal Business Database, the 
research version of the employer Business Register, longitudinally linked.
A recent paper by Marianne Bertrand, Emir Kamenica, and Jessica 
Pan (2015) provides an excellent illustration of the advantages of using 
10. Information about the SIPP database can be found here: https://www2.vrdc.cornell.
edu/news/data/sipp-synthetic-beta-file. Information about the SynLBD database can be 
found here: https://www2.vrdc.cornell.edu/news/data/lbd-synthetic-data/
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synthetic data that are part of a feedback loop. The authors use the admin-
istrative record values for married couples’ individual W-2 earnings to 
compute the proportion of household income that was due to each partner. 
They hypothesize that there should be a regression discontinuity at 50 per-
cent because of their model prediction that women should prefer to marry 
men with higher incomes than their own. The SSB data have undergone 
extensive SDL and, for this model, the effects of this SDL on the RD run-
ning variable was extensive, nonignorable, and had a stated “suppress and 
impute rate” of 100 percent. Analyses from synthetic data show no causal 
effect. However, analyses from the validation estimation on the confiden-
tial data, where the earnings variables have not been subjected to any SDL 
but are imputed when missing, show a clear discontinuity. The validated 
estimates are reported in the published paper. Any researcher anywhere in 
the world can use the SSB and SynLBD by following the instructions on 
the Cornell University-based server that is used as the interface for analy-
ses that are part of the feedback process.11
While writing this paper, we discovered why the analysis of the linked 
SIPP-IRS data by Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) showed no causal 
effect when the synthetic data were used. The reason can be seen by exam-
ining equation 1 when the running variable has been modified for every 
observation, as is the case in the SSB. The regression-discontinuity effect is 
not identified in the synthetic data, and it will not generally be identified for 
any RD design that uses the many exact earnings and date variables in the 
SSB. If only the SSB were available with no access to validation, RD and 
FRD analyses using these data would be pointless. However, because the 
SSB offers validation using the underlying confidential data and traditional 
SDL on the output coefficients, an analyst can do a specification search for 
the response functions f1 and f2 using the SSB, then submit the entire proto-
col from the specification search for validation. The validated estimate of 
the RD or FRD treatment effect provides the researcher’s first evidence on 
that effect. Thus, the use of the feedback mechanism for the synthetic data 
protected the research design from pretest estimation and false-discovery 
bias for the inferences on the causal RD effect, an incredible silver lining.
We have already noted that the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) uses 
synthetic data for SDL, based on the same model that is used for edit and 
imputation of item missing data. The statutory custodian for the SCF is 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The Fed maintains a very limited 
11. The Cornell-based server is located here: http://www2.vrdc.cornell.edu/news/
synthetic-data-server/step-1-requesting-access-to-sds/
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feedback loop that is described in the codebook (Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors 2013).
VI.B. Formal Privacy Systems
A researcher is much more likely to encounter a formal privacy system 
for SDL when interacting with a private data provider. Differential pri-
vacy was invented at Microsoft. As early as 2009, Microsoft had in place 
a system, Privacy Integrated Queries (PINQ), that allowed researchers to 
analyze its internal data files (such as search logs) with a fixed privacy 
budget using only analysis tools that were differentially private at every 
step of the process, including data editing (McSherry 2009). These tools 
ensure that every statistic seen by the researcher, and therefore available for 
publication, satisfies e-differential privacy. When the researcher exhausts e, 
no further access to the data is provided.
PINQ computes contingency tables, linear regressions, classifica-
tion models, and other statistical analyses using provably private algo-
rithms. Its developer recognized that a strong privacy guarantee comes 
at the expense of substantial accuracy. It was up to the analyst to decide 
how to mitigate that loss of accuracy. The analyst could spend most of 
the privacy budget to get some very accurate statistics—ones for which 
the inferences were not substantially altered as compared to the same 
inference based on the confidential data. But then the analysis was over, 
and the analyst could not formulate follow-up hypotheses because there 
was no remaining privacy budget. Alternatively, the analyst could use 
only a small portion of the privacy budget doing many specification 
searches, each one of which was highly inaccurate as compared to the 
same estimation using the confidential data, then use the remainder 
of the privacy budget to compute an accurate statistic for the chosen 
specification.
The literature on formal privacy models is still primarily theoretical. 
At present, there are serious concerns about the computational feasibil-
ity of applying formal privacy methods to large, high-dimensional data, 
as well as their analytical validity for nontrivial research questions. 
However, these methods make clear the cost in terms of loss of accu-
racy that is inherent in protecting privacy by distorting the analysis of 
the confidential data. The formal methods also allow setting a privacy 
budget that can be allocated across competing uses of the same under-
lying data.
Economists should have no trouble thinking about how to spend a pri-
vacy budget optimally during a data analysis. But they might also wonder 
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how any real empirical analysis can survive the rigors of never seeing the 
actual data. That is a legitimate worry, and one that the formal privacy com-
munity takes very seriously. For a glimpse of one possible future, see the 
work of Dwork (2014), who calls for all custodians of private data to pub-
lish the rate at which their data publication activities generate privacy losses 
and to pay a fine for nonprivate uses (infinite privacy loss, e = ∞). Public 
and private data providers will have an increasingly difficult time explain-
ing why they are unwilling to comply with this call when others begin to do 
so. The resulting public policy debate is very unlikely to result in less SDL 
applied to the inputs or outputs of economic data analyses.
VI.C. Analysis of Confidential Data in Enclaves
Because this paper is about the analysis of public-use data when the 
publisher has used statistical disclosure limitation, we have not discussed 
restricted access to the underlying confidential data. Restricted access 
to the confidential data also involves SDL. First, some agencies do not 
remove all of the SDL from the confidential files they allow researchers 
to use in enclaves. Second, the output of the researcher’s analysis of the 
confidential data is considered a custom tabulation from the agency’s per-
spective. The output is subjected to the same SDL methods that any other 
custom tabulation would require.
VII. Discussion
Unlike many other aspects of the processes by which data are produced, 
SDL is poorly understood and seldom discussed among economists. SDL 
is applied widely to the data most commonly used by economists, and the 
pressure on data custodians to protect privacy will only get stronger with 
time. We offer suggestions to researchers, journal editors, and statistical 
agencies to facilitate and advance SDL-aware economic research.
VII.A. Suggestions for Researchers
Over the decades since SDL was invented, research methods have 
changed dramatically—most notably in the applied microeconomists’ 
adoption of techniques that require both enormous amounts of data and 
very precise model-identifying information. The combination of these two 
requirements has led to much more extensive use of confidential data with 
the publication of only summary results. Studies carried out this way have 
very limited potential for replication or reuse of the confidential data. Grant 
funding agencies have insisted that the researchers they fund prepare a data 
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management plan for the curation of the data developed and analyzed using 
their funds, yet very few statistical agencies or private firms will surrender 
a copy of the confidential data for secure curation to allow research teams 
to comply with this requirement. Consequently, only the public portion 
of this scientific work can be curated and reused. But all such public data 
have been subjected to very substantial SDL, almost all of it in the form 
of suppression—none of the original confidential data and very little of the 
intermediate work product can be published.
Suppression on this scale leads to potentially massive biases and very 
limited data releases. To address this problem, over these same decades 
statisticians and computer scientists have worked to produce SDL methods 
that permit the publication of more data, including detailed microdata with 
large samples and precise model-identifying variables. Yet only a handful 
of applied economists are active in the SDL and data privacy communities. 
What Arthur Kennickell accomplished by integrating the editing, imputa-
tion, and SDL components of the Survey of Consumer Finances in 1995 
and orchestrating the release of those microdata in a format that required 
SDL-aware analysis methods was not accomplished again until 2007, 
when the Census Bureau released synthetic microdata for the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation. We believe that the reason economists 
have been reticent about exploring alternatives to suppression is that they 
have not fully understood how pernicious suppression bias actually is.
Statistical agencies do understand this, and the SDL and privacy- 
preserving methods they have adopted are designed to control suppression 
bias by introducing some deliberate variance. Economists tend to argue 
that the deliberate infusion of unrelated noise is a form of measurement 
error that infects all of the analyses. That is true, as we have shown, but 
it is an incomplete picture. Suppression too creates massive amounts of 
unseen bias—the direct consequence of not being able to analyze the data 
that are not released. Economists should recognize that the publication of 
altered data with more limited suppression instead of just the unsuppressed 
unaltered data could be a technologically superior solution to the SDL 
problem. We challenge more economists to become directly involved in 
the creation and use of SDL and privacy-preserving methods that are more 
useful to the discipline than the ones developed to serve the general user 
communities of statistical agencies and Internet companies.
In the meantime, what can productively be done? Economic research-
ers who use anything other than the most aggregated data should become 
more familiar with the methods used to produce those data: population 
frames, sampling, edit, imputation, and publication formulas, in addition 
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to SDL. This will help reduce the tendency to think of SDL as the only 
source of bias and variation. For students, these topics are usually covered 
in courses called “Survey Methodology,” but they belong in econometrics 
and economic measurement courses too.
VII.B. Suggestions for Journals, Editors and Referees
Journals should insist that authors document the entire production pro-
cess for the inputs and output of their analyses. The current standards are 
incomplete because they focus on the reproducibility of the published 
results from uncurated inputs. Economists do not even have a standard for 
citing data. A proper data citation identifies the provenance of the exact 
file used as the starting point for the analysis. Requiring proper citation 
of curated data inputs provides an incentive for those who perform such 
activities, just as proper software citation has provided an incentive to cre-
ate and maintain curated software distribution systems. Discussions of the 
consequences of frame definitions, sampling, edit, imputation, publication 
formulas, and SDL that were applied to the inputs are also important for 
any econometric analysis. If authors cannot cite sources that document 
each of these components, they should be required to include the informa-
tion in an archival appendix.
We make these points because we also want the journals to require 
documentation of the SDL procedures that were applied to the inputs 
and outputs of the analyses, although we do not think it is appropriate to 
single out SDL for special attention. The other aspects of data publication 
we discuss here also have implications for interpreting and reproducing 
the published results. If scientific journals added their voices to the calls 
for better documentation of all data publication methods, it would be 
easier to press statistical agencies to release more details of their SDL 
methods.
VII.C. Suggestions for Statistical Agencies and Other Data Providers
We think that the analysis in this paper should be considered a prima 
facie case for releasing more information about the actual parameters used 
in SDL methods and for favoring SDL methods that are amenable to SDL-
aware statistical analysis. By framing our arguments using methods already 
widely adopted to assess the effects of data quality issues, we hope to show 
that the users are also entitled to better information about specific SDL 
methods. We have also shown that if certain SDL methods are used, only 
very basic summary parameters need to be released. These can even be 
released as probability distributions, if desired.
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We stress that we are not singling out SDL for special attention. Very spe-
cific information about the sample design is released in the form of the sam-
pling frames used, detailed stratification structures, sampling rates, design 
weights, response rates, cluster information, replicate weights, and so on. 
Very specific information is released about items that have been edited, 
imputed or otherwise altered to address data quality concerns. But virtually 
nothing—nothing specific—is released about SDL parameters. This imbal-
ance fuels the view that the SDL methods may have unduly influenced a 
particular analysis. In addition, it is critical to know which SDL methods 
have been permanently applied to the data, so that they must be considered 
even when restricted access is granted to the confidential data files.
Our remarks are not directed exclusively to government statistical agen-
cies; they apply with equal force to Amazon, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, 
Netflix, Yahoo, and other Internet giants as they begin to release data prod-
ucts like Google Trends for use by the research community.
VIII. Conclusion
Although SDL is an important component of the data publication pro-
cess, it need not be more mysterious or inherently problematic than other 
widely used and well understood methods for sampling, editing, and impu-
tation, all of which affect the quality of analyses that economists perform 
on published data. Enough is known about current SDL methods to permit 
modeling their consequences for estimation of means, quantiles, propor-
tions, moments, regression models, instrumental variables models, regres-
sion discontinuity designs, and regression kink models. We have defined 
ignorable SDL methods in a model-dependent manner that is exactly par-
allel to the way ignorability is defined for missing-data models. We have 
shown that an SDL process is ignorable if one can apply the methods that 
would be appropriate for the confidential data directly to the published 
data and reach the same conclusions.
Most SDL systems are not ignorable. This is hardly surprising, since 
the main justification for using SDL is limiting the ability of the analyst 
to draw conclusions about unusual data elements such as re-identifying a 
respondent or a sensitive attribute. The same tools that help assess the influ-
ence of experimental design and missing data on model conclusions can be 
used to make any data analysis SDL-aware. One such system, the multiple 
imputation model used for SDL by the Survey of Consumer Finances, has 
operated quite successfully for two decades. Other systems, most notably 
the synthetic data systems with feedback loops operated by the Census 
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Bureau, are quite new but permit fully SDL-aware analyses of important 
household and business microdata sources.
Finally, we have shown that the methods we developed here can be used 
effectively on real data and that the consequences of SDL for data analysis 
are limited, at least for the models we considered here. When methods that 
add noise are used, there is less bias than for equivalent analyses that use 
data subjected to suppression. The extra variability that the noise-infusion 
methods generate is of a manageable magnitude.
We use these findings to press for two actions: (i) publication of more 
SDL details by the statistical agencies so that it is easier to assess whether 
or not SDL matters in a particular analysis and (ii) less trepidation by our 
research colleagues in using data that have been published with extensive 
SDL. There is no reason to treat the use of SDL as significantly more chal-
lenging than the analysis of quasi-experimental data or an analysis with 
substantial nonignorable missing data.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
CAROLINE HOXBY  I began graduate school in economics in the hey-
day of survey data. Nearly all applied microeconomists relied intensely on 
data from surveys supported by the federal government. This was an era 
in which good researchers knew the Current Population Survey, the Public 
Use Microdata Samples of the Census, and other major surveys inside and 
out. They routinely discussed apparently obscure points about imputation 
of missing data in a particular variable or how changing response rates 
biased the time trend in another variable. Little did they know it, but the 
era of survey data was already passing to make way for an era in which 
administrative data would become dominant.1 Indeed, as discussed below, 
the same researchers who were steeped in survey data were pushing causal 
empirical techniques that would eventually induce more and more scholars 
to shift to administrative data. I was able to see this myself by the time 
I wrote my dissertation: techniques like differences-in-differences worked 
much more smoothly with the administrative data on which I partially 
relied. Today, many newly minted Ph.D.s in applied microeconomics have 
only used administrative or other data gathered through similar means.
Administrative data are automatically compiled in the course of admin-
istering a program. Examples are tax data; social insurance data such as 
unemployment, disability, public pensions, Medicare and Medicaid; data 
from patient medical visits; educational records from schools; criminal jus-
tice data from police, courts, and incarceration; mortgage regulation data, 
credit agency records; and so on. Although usually called big data rather than 
administrative data, the data from businesses, especially online businesses 
1. There are numerous papers on this topic, but a good introduction is Angrist and Pischke 
2010.
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like Amazon or Facebook, that can automatically compile information have 
a similar flavor. No one is surveyed and data are gathered on a population 
of users, not a sample.
Researchers who are old enough to have used survey and administrative 
data in parallel tend to appreciate the strengths of each type. For instance, 
surveys can directly ask the questions to which we would most like answers: 
“Are you searching for work (unemployed) or happily out of the labor 
force?” Surveys can gather rich sociodemographic data. They can reach 
people who do not “participate”—people who do not use credit, for exam-
ple. However, such appreciation for surveys is falling among newly minted 
economists. They often look down on survey data as obviously inferior: 
the sample sizes seem too small, the responses too prone to reporting 
error and missing data, and the sampling too opaque. When asked to drum 
up support for a federal survey among young colleagues, I often find their 
responses to be muted or even ambivalent. Why support expensive sur-
veys that they have not used and might never use more than occasionally 
to supplement or provide descriptive context for their analyses based on 
administrative data?
This is the world into which John Abowd and Ian Schmutte send their 
paper on statistical disclosure limitation (SDL). It is an admirable, thorough, 
and careful paper, replete with wisdom. It offers us telling examples and 
gem-like insights based on them. It will surely become economists’ key 
reference for SDL. In short, one can learn a great deal from the paper.
However, the paper is oddly out-of-step with the context into which it was 
born: a context in which researchers are abandoning survey data altogether. 
While I and the authors would almost certainly agree that surveys ought to 
continue and are crucial in many applications, I think that we predict the 
likely response to their paper somewhat differently. The authors hope that 
it will drive researchers to become sophisticated about SDL, account for 
its effects in their research, and document it when publishing. I believe that 
their paper will horrify researchers who currently are unaware of SDL but 
who are already dubious about survey data. It will drive them deeper into 
the administrative-data-only camp.
Moreover, I disagree with the authors on who ought to bear the burden 
of lessening the negative impact of SDL on the accuracy of research. The 
authors put too much onus on researchers. This seems wrong not only for 
practical reasons (discussed below) but also because it flies in the face 
of political logic. Federal statistical agencies need researchers to support 
and use their data if they are to justify the expense of surveys. Since these 
same agencies introduce SDL to data that would otherwise be free of it, 
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they are in a far better position to manage its impact than are researchers 
who are downstream of the SDL being applied. If these agencies want to 
keep up their surveys, it is they who need to take up the burden of lessening 
the negative impact of SDL on research.
WHAT WE LEARN FROM THIS PAPER The authors could not be more cor-
rect when they assert that “modern SDL procedures are a black box whose 
effect on empirical analysis is not well understood.” And they do indeed 
“pry open the black box” and describe what they see. At least, they describe 
what we are allowed to see, which in some cases is quite limited.
SDL is intended to protect the confidentiality of survey respondents when 
data are released for public use.2 The authors provide the example of a male 
household head from Athens, Georgia, who has 10 children. He may be 
the only person in the entire United States with such characteristics. Thus, 
if we knew his characteristics and wanted to learn surreptitiously about 
his family income, we might scour the American Community Survey and 
Current Population Survey in the hope that he is a participant in one of 
them. Since the former is a 1 percent sample and the latter a 0.1 percent 
sample of the U.S. population, our effort would be extremely likely to end 
up producing nothing of interest even if SDL were not applied. However, 
SDL is applied to these data and would probably prevent us from learning 
his income.
The authors explain all of the SDL methods used to protect the fecund 
father from Athens. All of them alter the data so that he cannot be identified 
with certainty. Thus, data swapping might cause some of his data to be 
swapped with data from another household head in a different area of the 
country. Coarsening might make his number of children “five or more” 
instead of 10. Noise infusion might give him 10 children plus or minus 
three. Synthetic data would destroy his (and everyone else’s) actual data 
completely but would allow us to compute certain prespecified statistics on 
fake data and nevertheless obtain the correct numbers.
We now see why agencies that apply SDL are unwilling to disclose their 
methods with much exactitude. If we knew that the father would always be 
swapped with another father of 10 in a neighboring county, we might try 
to find all of the “possibles” and learn that his income took one of only a 
2. SDL is also applied to certain administrative data that are released for public use. 
However, there are often “restricted” versions of these data to which qualified researchers 
with a relevant project can gain access in a strictly controlled environment. The restricted 
versions are often free from SDL treatment. Thus, I focus on survey data, which federal 
agencies appear always to treat with SDL.
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few values. If we knew that his number of children would be plus or minus 
three, we could focus on Athens fathers with seven or thirteen children. 
If we had synthetic data and were allowed to learn which statistics could 
be computed accurately and how inaccurate other statistics would be, we 
might be able to back out the father’s actual data—albeit with an analytic 
and computational burden so enormous that it would be more sensible to 
apply our formidable skills and nefarious inclinations to more remunerative 
tasks. In short, if agencies disclose their SDL methods in too much detail, 
data users might be able to undo it. This is why agencies hesitate to give 
more than vague descriptions and never disclose exact parameters.
To help us think through the effects of SDL, the authors introduce 
the concept of ignorability, well known in statistics but not common 
parlance among applied economists. SDL is ignorable if the researcher can 
use the SDL-treated data just as though it were the clean, confidential data 
and produce estimates and inferences that are the same as the clean data 
would produce. The authors’ discussion of ignorability is highly useful in 
and of itself, even if it does not change the way people manage SDL. Econ-
omists are already comfortable discussing measurement error, imputation, 
and biases due to selection into nonresponse. They need a framework for 
thinking clearly about SDL.
Using a combination of examples and models, the authors explain which 
types of SDL are ignorable under which circumstances. The main lesson 
is that SDL is not ignorable unless the researcher wants to use the data to 
construct the statistics that are those already published by the agencies or 
that the agencies foresaw that researchers would want to construct when 
setting up SDL. Fundamentally, the problem is that statistical agencies are 
forced to develop a strategy for publishing data for public use, but in order 
to have a strategy they must trade off confidentiality risk (the cost) against 
data usefulness (the benefit). But whether the data are “useful” depends on 
the use, so agencies are forced to decide in advance what the uses will be in 
order to conduct SDL. Unless the researcher’s use happens to be a use they 
foresaw and took into account, SDL will negatively affect the accuracy of 
estimates and inferences. The authors put this point well: “Any such . . . 
strategy inherently advantages certain analyses over others.” Moreover, the 
agencies will not reveal their strategy to the researcher so he cannot even 
know whether his use is one that they foresaw or one that they did not. It 
is thus extremely difficult for even the most diligent researcher to prevent 
herself from unintentionally generating misleading analyses.
A researcher is on the safest ground if she is merely publishing descrip-
tive statistics in a noncausal analysis and those descriptive statistics are 
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(i) means (ii) based on large subgroups of the data and (iii) fairly similar 
to statistics that the agencies published themselves. Similarity to pub-
lished statistics may make cross-validation possible. For instance, if means 
of adjusted gross income were published and the researcher computed 
mean tax payments for exactly the same subgroups, tax law would allow 
the researcher to check whether the two sets of means were reasonably 
compatible.
Unfortunately, most of what researchers do does not fit that descrip-
tion of safe ground. Modern causal empirical methods, like regression dis-
continuity and differences-in-differences (with its many extensions), make 
accuracy indispensable, use subgroups that are thin slices of the popula-
tion, and compute statistics that are so unlike those reported in government 
statistics that cross-validation can definitively eliminate only outlandishly 
wrong estimates. Researchers who are less concerned about causal analysis 
but who use SDL data in structural models are also negatively affected: SDL 
always affects inference on model parameters because researchers cannot 
correct for the uncertainty it introduces.
Concrete examples may be helpful here. One particularly important 
application of regression discontinuity is to compulsory schooling laws 
which generate a birthday cut-off for enrolling a child in school. For 
instance, in certain school districts if a child is age five by September 30th 
she should be enrolled in kindergarten. Such cutoffs have been used to 
estimate the effect of education on earnings, childbearing, and numerous 
other outcomes.3 SDL might mean that all such estimates are wrong. This 
is because compulsory schooling laws necessarily generate a slightly fuzzy 
discontinuity: some parents of children with a September 30 birthday will 
be able to hold off enrollment for a year. Some parents of children with 
an October 1 birthday will manage to enroll their child. If SDL has added 
noise to birthdays, swapped birthdays, swapped locations, or constructed 
synthetic data that do not exactly foresee this application, the estimates 
could be highly inaccurate. True September 30 and October 1 children could 
be given August birthdays and August children could be given birthdays 
near the cutoff. Children who truly live in districts where the cutoff is 
November 30 could be swapped into districts where the cutoff is Septem-
ber 30. Because some children do actually enroll on the “wrong” side of 
3. There are now a large number of such papers based on data from several countries. It is 
worth noting that some papers use Census data subjected to SDL while others use administra-
tive birth records that, as far as is known, have not been subjected to SDL. See, for instance, 
Dobkin and Ferreira 2010.
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the birthday cutoff, the researcher will have no way to know whether his 
regression discontinuity results are consistent or ruined by SDL. I am con-
fident that any researcher who reads the authors’ paper and wants to use 
compulsory schooling laws will henceforth flee SDL-treated data in favor of 
clean administrative data (from birth certificates, for example).4
An important application of differences-in-differences methods is to the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC has had its generosity changed 
at various times, and the changes sometimes apply only to families with, 
say, three or more children. Thus, a researcher might exploit the before-after 
change in generosity for the families with exactly three children, and she 
might use the families with exactly two children to eliminate time trends 
that would have affected the three-child families even if the generosity of 
the program had not changed. If SDL changes families’ numbers of chil-
dren even slightly, this empirical method could generate highly misleading 
results. Actually, the situation would likely be worse. Researchers do not 
typically compare all three-child families to all two-child families with 
a simple differences-in-means. They usually condition on indicators for 
state of residence, local area economic conditions, race, ethnicity, mother’s 
education, child age, and other variables. Thus, the data are sliced into 
thin subgroups that could be extremely affected if SDL has been applied 
to these other conditioning variables as well as to the number of chil-
dren. It is disturbing to think that researchers who exerted so much effort 
analyzing the EITC with survey data could have all their good work undone 
by SDL and have no way of knowing it. One can understand why they 
would flee to administrative data, such as tax data, for their next project 
on the topic.
THE AUTHORS’ SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCHERS Although the authors’ analy-
sis of the effects of SDL on estimation and inference is very helpful, their 
suggestions for researchers are less so.
One suggestion is that researchers attempt to back out some information 
on SDL from different sources of data to which different versions of SDL 
4. The authors point out that SDL has little effect on strict regression discontinuity because 
the researcher knows that any person on the wrong side of a discontinuity must be SDL-
affected. However, this type of strictness is merely a theoretical possibility used for exposition 
of regression discontinuity. I was unable to think of a single applied example where strictness 
was perfect. Even examples drawn from authoritarian regimes and the military, which can 
presumably enforce cutoffs more stringently than others, exhibit some amount of fuzziness. 
Even administrative tax and social insurance data exhibit slight fuzziness. For instance, a 
person who earns one dollar more than the cutoff for a tax credit is often allowed to take the 
credit if she claims it. Authorities rarely waste effort on such cases.
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have been applied (although the researcher will not have been told about 
the differences in the versions). The authors cite the example of J. Trent 
Alexander, Michael Davern, and Betsey Stevenson (2010), who demonstrate 
that different versions of Census and American Community Survey data 
that were supposed to be the same actually produced systematically dif-
ferent results when certain statistics were computed. From this exercise, 
they became aware that SDL was making certain computations unreliable. 
Now, we could presumably assign numerous economists to conduct com-
parisons à la Alexander, Davern, and Stevenson on a tremendous scale. We 
could compute numerous statistics for all oft-used survey data until, as a 
profession, we derived greater understanding of where SDL was likely to 
be nonignorable. This seems to be the content of the authors’ suggestion.
This suggestion does not make sense. True, in some circumstances, 
researchers could—with a great deal of effort—deduce enough about SDL 
to account for it better in their analyses. However, if agencies want us to 
know the parameters of SDL, they ought to give them to us (which they 
could do with minimal effort). If agencies do not want us to know about 
certain parameters, they should not provide data that allow them to be 
inferred through cross-referencing.
The authors suggest that researchers rely more on synthetic data. But this 
assumes that agencies will somehow become remarkably prescient about 
the research that people will want to conduct in the future with the synthetic 
data. I see no evidence of such prescience. Indeed, it is the nature of origi-
nal research that it cannot be foreseen. Realistically, agencies inevitably 
produce synthetic data that produce the sort of calculations that they need 
to publish to fulfil their reporting mandates. But since these calculations are 
already available, the synthetic data may be of little further use.
Moreover, we do not want agencies to foresee the research that people 
will want to conduct for the same reason we do not want agencies to attempt 
causal evaluations themselves. The conflict of interest that arises when 
agency staff evaluate a program that its leaders champion (or wish to see 
eliminated) is enormous. Staff can be pressured to use favorable but flawed 
empirical methods, apply SDL to make unfavorable but better methods 
impossible to use, use SDL to make unfavorable data disappear, and so on. 
If we do not wish to create an environment in which such pressure might 
be brought to bear, we ought not to ask agencies to conduct or foresee the 
work of outside researchers. Outside researchers’ conflict-of-interest prob-
lems that are related to federal programs are nearly always trivial compared 
to those that could arise within agencies. The agencies have more degrees 
of freedom (because they collect data and have the right to alter it) and 
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their leaders are far more closely identified with particular programs than 
are outside researchers.
The authors also suggest data validation. This occurs when researchers 
conduct all of their exploratory analysis using fake data and then send their 
final code to be run on the actual, clean data. This is a somewhat useful 
suggestion because it would at least allow researchers to avoid unintention-
ally publishing estimates that are grossly incorrect because of SDL, about 
which they were unable to learn. But data validation is not a fix. Since 
the researcher is forced to explore only fake data, she may be unable to 
recognize crucial patterns in the data that actually exist. Great empiricists 
are people who are superb at recognizing patterns in data and seeing the 
patterns’ relationship to hypotheses. Data validation makes them operate 
with blindfolds on.5
The authors suggest that journals should require researchers to supply 
details of the SDL applied to their data. They go further, in fact, and argue 
that if such requirements were implemented, researchers would lobby agen-
cies to learn more about how SDL affected their estimates. These arguments 
seem to get the incentives wrong. Journals pressure researchers who pres-
sure agencies to provide information that the agencies do not want to pro-
vide. The careers of agency staff do not depend on whether the researcher is 
able to publish his paper. If anything, agencies sometimes want to pick and 
choose which papers get published. Giving them an indirect mechanism 
for doing this is not a good idea.
SDL SHOULD CHANGE IN RECOGNITION OF HOW THE WORLD IS CHANGING 
I would argue that SDL needs to change in recognition of how the world 
is changing: SDL must become nearly always ignorable when the data are 
used in the ways that modern economists use data. This means that SDL 
treatment must be lightened. Alternatively, survey and other data to which 
SDL is normally applied must be made available in a clean form to qualified 
researchers in carefully controlled, secure settings. These changes should 
be initiated and accomplished by the agencies themselves. Researchers 
simply do not have the tools to make these changes occur.
Why must SDL change? There are three reasons. First, as I already 
emphasized, SDL can wreak havoc on modern causal empirical methods 
5. Of course, if the researcher could send every preliminary result to be validated, she 
could accomplish pattern recognition, albeit slowly and probably less well because of the 
time costs. However, agencies that wanted to enforce strong SDL would necessarily limit 
the number of results that a researcher could validate. Otherwise, the researcher could back 
out the SDL parameters that the agencies wanted to obscure.
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and modern methods of inference. The methods in place were devised in 
an era when it was supposed that data would be used very differently. If the 
data are to be useful, SDL must keep up with methods.
Second, agencies may soon find it impossible to defend their surveys from 
budget cuts. Already, support is notably falling among young researchers. 
The flight to administrative data will not reverse itself, because it is a con-
sequence of nonreversible progress made on methods. This reality raises 
the costs of any given amount of SDL: by accelerating the switch to admin-
istrative data, it could ultimately destroy the surveys themselves. (Here, we 
must differentiate SDL from missing data imputation and reporting error. 
The latter problems are also driving the switch to administrative data, but 
missing or erroneous data can be extremely hard to remedy. In contrast, 
SDL is imposed on data that could have remained clean.)
Third, the nightmare “database of ruin” scenarios that the authors pre-
sent under “What does SDL protect?” are made less likely by the advent of 
big data from an increasing number of Internet and other sources. While it 
may seem odd that people are so willing to have their personal information 
in the hands of Facebook, Google, Intuit (the company behind TurboTax 
and Mint), and numerous other sites and retailers, this is the reality. If any 
thinking person wants to compile a database of ruin, it would be inefficient, 
unnecessarily difficult, and expensive for him to do it through a federal 
survey. Why should one start with Census data in an attempt to find the 
father of 10 in Athens, Georgia? It would be far easier to offer him a small 
incentive to sign up for an Internet-based service that would ask his income 
in return for helpful consumer or tax advice.
Each day, we read prima facie evidence that big data are now more 
sought after by those with nefarious ends than are federal survey data. The 
authors note that “it has been roughly six decades since the last reported 
breach of data privacy within the federal statistical system. One is hard-
pressed to find a report of the American Community Survey, for example, 
being ‘hacked.’ ” It has not been six decades since hackers stole infor-
mation from credit card providers, banks, massive stores like Target and 
Home Depot, and numerous Internet sites to which people have voluntarily 
uploaded information. Such data breaches occur every day. They appear to 
require far less effort and to provide far more accurate income and other 
information than roundabout methods applied to one-percent samples of 
the U.S. population. It only seems sensible to acknowledge that risks are 
gravitating away from survey data and toward other data. Surely agency 
efforts to prevent confidential information leaks ought to flow in the same 
direction as the risk.
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COMMENT BY
BETSEY STEVENSON  John Abowd and Ian Schmutte have done an 
important public service writing this paper. In my experience, too few 
researchers are aware of statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) procedures, 
and therefore far too few are using the appropriate methods to adjust for 
the distortions introduced by these produces. Without such an awareness, 
researchers cannot make appropriate modifications or validations. These 
issues are therefore not side issues but critical to researchers’ attempts to 
use data to make valid inferences about the world.
The authors provide a very nice framework for thinking about ignorable 
and non-ignorable SDL procedures and their implications for different types 
of econometric analysis. They then provide thorough explanations of the 
types of SDL techniques commonly used, the way researchers should adapt 
given each of these techniques, and the tell-tale signs to identify whether 
data have been distorted. They provide concrete guidance to researchers 
and journal editors. Without a doubt, this paper should be required reading 
for empiricists, particularly for every graduate student thinking of doing 
empirical work.
Given the authors’ success at delivering such guidance, in my comments 
I want to focus on three big-picture issues that the paper raises: First, what 
more can government statistical agencies do to better balance the value 
of data against privacy concerns? Second, what are the responsibilities of 
researchers and journal editors in helping to curate our national data? And 
third, what are the needs for disclosure avoidance going forward, including 
in other sources of data?
BALANCING THE VALUE OF DATA AGAINST PRIVACY CONCERNS One challenge 
that the U.S. statistical agencies face is that they are seeking to meet a stan-
dard of zero probability of disclosure. But as the paper makes clear, it is 
not possible to have data with a zero probability of inferential disclosure— 
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for that to occur, the data would have to be “all noise, no signal” and hence 
useless. So there is an inherent tension in the system: the standard that 
those in the statistical agencies are being held to is incompatible with the 
goal of providing data that are useful.
In 2003, the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Effi-
ciency Act of 2002 (CIPSEA) was signed into law, tightening protections 
for statistical data collected under a pledge of confidentiality. The goal 
of CIPSEA was to ensure that those who supply information under such 
a pledge to statistical agencies for statistical purposes will only have 
their data used for statistical purposes and will not have that information 
disclosed to any unauthorized person. The legislation made it clear that 
there is no acceptable level of noncompliance with the CIPSEA pledge. 
The interpretation of the statute from the Office of Management and 
Budget stated that agencies are required to provide “a uniform high level 
of protection for all information gathered by Federal agencies under a 
pledge of confidentiality for exclusively statistical purposes” (Wallman 
and Harris-Kojetin 2004, p. 1800).
Yet a “high level” is not clearly defined in terms of how much disclosure 
risk one should tolerate. As a result, many interpreted the guidance as sug-
gesting zero tolerance. A natural policy question is how much disclosure 
risk should we tolerate in data? And a related question is whether we owe 
a higher degree of confidentiality to data collected for statistical purposes 
(the current policy is that we do). Finally, it is also not clear that those 
within the statistical agencies are the best situated to determine the level of 
risk that is acceptable.
For many folks working in the statistical agencies, there is a percep-
tion that the loss function puts infinite weight on the risk of disclosure. 
This is not because the risk to any particular individual from their data 
being disclosed is infinite, but because the political risk is great: such a 
dis closure, even one that did minimal harm, would lead to sharp congres-
sional action to curtail data collection for statistical purposes. Moreover, 
data workers also face great personal risk if they are deemed responsible 
for a disclosure incident. A Census employee is told that he or she could 
face up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine for having released 
data that allowed a business or individual to be identified.1 Notably, the 
punishment for disclosure is not a function of whether the disclosure did 
harm or even whether it revealed valuable information. Even if a Census 
1. 13 U.S.C. 214.
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worker disclosed government-collected data for statistical purposes that is 
also elsewhere publically available, he or she would face the same punish-
ment as if the disclosure did cause damage. In short, for statistical agency 
employees, their risk is not a function of the harm of disclosure.
For example, the Census Bureau had data on which businesses experi-
enced flooding during Hurricane Katrina, but it could not publish a map 
showing all the businesses that were flooded even though anyone walking 
down the street could have hand-collected the data and published such a 
map. Nor did this policy change just because Google Maps now enables 
people anywhere in the world to zoom into street views using smartphones 
to see detailed images of flooded businesses.
One has to wonder whether there is a principal-agent problem here, so 
that those in charge of disclosure avoidance are less willing to tolerate risk 
than the general public would be. Public data are undoubtedly an essential 
part of our national infrastructure, but even if we accept that Congress may 
take drastic action in the face of a breach in which privacy was compro-
mised, we may still want those in the statistical agencies to accept some 
risk of this occurring. Statistical agencies have to balance the risk of dis-
closure, including political risk, with the usefulness of the data.
While economists might naturally think about how much risk should be 
tolerated in terms of costs and benefits, some people object on civil liberty 
grounds to the government’s compelling respondents to provide any per-
sonal data. These civil libertarians view a breach of such data as having 
a greater cost than if the equivalent data collected by a nongovernmental 
source were breached, for example through the hacking of a data set com-
piled by a private-sector company or even the hacking of a government 
administrative data set. Abowd and Schmutte argue that a key principle 
of confidentiality is “that individual information should only be used for 
the statistical purposes for which it was collected” and that it “should not 
be used in a way that might harm the individual.” However, this misses 
the subtle yet important distinction that the standard for data collected for 
statistical purposes is greater than the standard for administrative data. 
It also overlooks the belief held by the government, as articulated by 
the Office of Management and Budget in its implementing guidance on 
CIPSEA, that the “purposes for which and the conditions under which 
the data were collected” (Wallman and Harris-Kojetin 2004, page 1800) 
are critical when making decisions about how to protect confidentiality 
and provide access to the data.
Respondents are required by law to complete Census surveys, and they 
can be jailed or fined for noncompliance. Although no nonresponders have 
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actually been fined or jailed, some members of Congress have sought to 
remove the requirement that the survey be completed so as to explicitly 
make survey responses voluntary. These advocates argue that the gov-
ernment should not force Americans to reveal private information. Such 
civil liberty concerns were cited as the primary motivation when Stephen 
Harper, then Canada’s prime minister, made the Canadian long-form Cen-
sus voluntary, a move that has dramatically decreased the statistical reli-
ability of the data. Harper’s stated justification was that citizens should not 
“be forced, under threat of fines, jail, or both, to disclose extensive private 
and personal information” (Casselman 2015).
In general, the majority of the U.S. public has been concerned about 
government data and privacy risk for some time, although this concern 
is not limited to data collected for statistical purposes. Since the 1980s, 
about once every 10 years the General Social Survey has asked respondents 
whether increased computing power coupled with the federal government’s 
access to private information presents a threat to individual privacy.2 Con-
sistently, as shown in my figure 1, a majority of adult respondents—about 
two-thirds in 2006—state that this access to information presents either a 
very serious or a fairly serious threat to privacy.
Beyond thinking about how much disclosure risk we should tolerate, 
we should also consider who should be held responsible for a breach. Cur-
rently, it is employees of the statistical agencies that make decisions about 
the trade-off between risk and useful data while facing the threat of legal 
and financial sanction if the data is misused. If legal sanctions were instead 
directed toward those who would misuse the data, this could provide a 
level of protection that would allow the pendulum to shift more toward 
useful data. For example, making it illegal to attempt to identify people in 
purposefully anonymized data could provide protections that go beyond 
data collected for statistical purposes.
Currently, some users of the data do bear personal responsibility and 
are rewarded with access to less distorted data—researchers have access 
to data with fewer manipulations applied through the Federal Statistical 
Research Data Centers (RDC). According to Census, aside from some 
2. The complete text of this and other General Social Survey questions may be viewed 
in the General Social Survey “1972–2014 Cumulative Codebook” made available online by 
the National Opinion Research Center at http://publicdata.norc.org/GSS/DOCUMENTS/ 
BOOK/GSS_Codebook.pdf. This survey question appears there on p. 2077. Note that ques-
tion wording for many questions varies slightly across years.
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swapping, there are very few adjustments made to these data, so research-
ers should know that even when public-use files are available, the data 
that they can use in the RDCs may be better suited for their projects. More 
generally, this illustrates the benefits to making data available of having 
trusted users. Another option is for Census to develop more licensed data 
products. Licensing data would allow Census both to expand the number 
of trusted users and to employ the threat of legal sanctions as a substitute 
for greater disclosure avoidance methods, without the costs to the agencies 
and users of RDCs.
Additionally, Census could move in the direction that the authors sug-
gest and use more synthetic data with validation by the statistical agency. 
RDCs could potentially be used for validation studies, although Census 
argues that it is not currently set up to do that. The difficulty is funding. 
And on a purely practical level, having the right staffing to create more 
synthetic data presents a challenge—the application of SDL techniques 
takes a different, and lesser, skill set then what is required for creating 
synthetic data. That current staffing is not well-suited to the creation of 
synthetic data creates a bias toward nonsynthetic data techniques. So 
even though synthetic data will surely be preferable to substitution and 
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suppression in the medium to long term, researchers and perhaps private 
sector funders may need to play a role.
RESEARCHERS’ AND JOURNAL EDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP CURATE OUR 
NATIONAL DATA Given the increasing costs associated with providing useful 
data in which privacy is protected, a natural policy question is whether Cen-
sus and the statistical agencies should move toward a fee-for-service model 
in which they charge for validation or charge for licensed data. There are 
very few occurrences of statistical agencies collecting money from outside 
sources, but in an era of budget cuts this may be one of the only ways to 
increase access to the data. Two obstacles to such a funding mechanism are 
practical. For academic researchers this may just be moving money around 
the government, since researchers would seek government funding for vali-
dation fees if they were to be imposed, ultimately leaving the government 
to fund the full costs of data provision. However, a fee-for-service model 
could help ensure that the most valuable data get created and maintained by 
allowing data users to direct funding to data. The second obstacle relates to 
civil liberties: Can data that is required be “sold,” even when the cost is to 
cover the marginal cost of, for example, a validation study?
What about private sector funding? With more of the data masked for 
disclosure avoidance reasons, demand for Census’s internal analysis of the 
data will grow. Should Census also operate a consulting arm in which it 
provides analysis of data, including program evaluation, for a fee? Cur-
rently, program evaluators may not be able to access restricted data since 
there is concern about allowing private sector researchers into the RDCs 
to conduct program evaluation. Even when such work is being done for a 
government agency and cannot be done with the public-use files, the cur-
rent system is not designed to allow paid contractors access to the data.
Let me turn to the economics profession’s responsibility. The authors 
deserve enormous praise for this really important work designed to help 
researchers understand how to use the data that are produced and made 
available by statistical agencies and to understand issues of privacy that 
impact all data sets. Our profession has far too few rewards for academics 
who contribute to the public good by helping to curate and improve our 
national statistics. This incentive structure leaves too many academics 
ignorant about the way data are collected and prepared for use, and it 
means that, too often, problems in the data go undiscovered and improve-
ments go unmade.
We in the profession should have standards under which graduate stu-
dents, as part of their training, are more actively engaged in validating both 
research and data. For instance, one could set up RDCs so that graduate 
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students used them to validate papers as part of their graduate training and 
as a useful assessment of both the authors’ methodology and their data.
Perhaps most importantly, in reviewing empirical research a first ques-
tion should be whether an empirical finding can be replicated in other avail-
able data sets. While this will not always solve or even illuminate issues 
related to disclosure limitation procedures, it may identify them and help 
to identify problems in the data more generally, including those related to 
data masking. Multiple datasets are not always available, but to the extent 
that they are it should be de rigueur to have multiple dataset validation. 
Empirical researchers should test results across as many data sets as pos-
sible, in the same way researchers run specification tests or other tests for 
sensitivity of their results.
The authors discuss problems with Census 2000 and several years of the 
American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) that stemmed from the misapplication of statistical disclosure limita-
tion procedures. These problems went undetected for many years and were 
discovered in research that I did with J. Trent Alexander and Michael Dav-
ern comparing marriage rates by age across several data sets; we noticed 
inconsistent findings around the interaction of marriage and reaching full 
retirement age (Alexander, Davern, and Stevenson 2010). What at first 
appeared to be an interesting pattern of divorce around qualification for 
Social Security turned out to be a spurious result that reflected the mis-
application of disclosure limitation procedures. That misapplication led to 
age- and sex-specific population estimates generated from the original ACS 
and CPS public-use files that differed by up to 15 percent from the counts 
using the full, confidential data.
Although Census did not release corrected versions of the CPS public-
use microdata, it did amend the public-use ACS and Census files. My 
figure 2 shows that the perturbed and unperturbed data in the 2009 CPS 
still have substantial differences in the male-female ratio. The Census did 
amend its age perturbation procedures for the CPS to attempt to reduce 
these discrepancies, changes that became effective in January 2011. It 
also led the agency to compare income and poverty summary statistics 
between the perturbed and unperturbed files; when it did so, it found that, 
with a few exceptions of narrow age categories and race/ethnic groups, 
poverty rates and average incomes were statistically similar (at the 10 per-
cent level) across the files. But the places where differences occur illus-
trate the types of challenges that Abowd and Schmutte lay out in their 
paper. My figure 3 shows that mean earnings by race for men age 65 and 
older are similar in the perturbed and unperturbed data. However, as my 
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, available at https:/www.census.gov/cps/user_note_age_ estimates.html.
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figure 4 shows, when the ages are broken down further—separating those 
ages 65 to 69 from those 75 and older—substantial differences can be seen 
across the perturbed and unperturbed data.
This instance demonstrates that we can improve on our data collection 
and processing capabilities and that the profession plays an important role 
in ensuring that the data are reliable and useful. As the economics field has 
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become more empirical, these considerations have become increasingly 
important, not just for statistical agencies but for individual researchers 
as well. And because the economics profession is in the midst of a revo-
lution in which greater empiricism is coupled with accelerating comput-
ing power for collecting and analyzing data, we need to grapple with the 
trade-off between transparency and anonymity: between increasing access 
to comprehensive data, easing the replication of empirical results, and pro-
viding transparent analysis on the one hand and, on the other, ensuring that 
respondents are not identifiable from the survey information they provide. 
The replication movement pushed people to make their data available to 
other researchers, but in a world in which publicly used data are held to a 
replication standard, it may take more effort to balance transparency and 
anonymity, so the need for us to increase the rewards for replication is 
even greater.
THE NEED FOR DISCLOSURE AVOIDANCE GOING FORWARD While some may 
argue that the professional researcher will turn away from government 
survey data, shifting instead to administrative or private-sector data, this 
offers a false sense of protection for researchers. Researchers are indeed 
shifting away from government survey data, something that Raj Chetty 
demonstrated at the 2012 National Bureau of Economic Research Summer 
Institute by showing that the use of such data in leading economic jour-
nals has steadily fallen since 1980, while papers using administrative data 
have become increasingly common (Chetty 2012). His results are shown 
in my figures 5 and 6, which track journals through 2010; an examina-
tion of more recent years suggests these trends continued through 2014. 
At the same time, researchers are increasingly collecting their own data 
through field experiments and randomized controlled trials (List and 
Rasul 2010). Both of these trends highlight that researchers today are 
less limited in the questions they ask by data that the federal government 
makes publicly available.
However, this increasing scope to collect data ourselves comes with its 
own privacy concerns. All government-funded research in the United States 
is governed by the “Common Rule,” a set of ethics guidelines regarding 
biomedical and behavioral research. This regulation governs Institutional 
Review Boards and provides guidance on disclosure limitation, requiring 
that personally identifiable information remain confidential at all times. 
However, the guidelines under the Common Rule are not as clear as the 
ones that Census must follow, and while it may be the case that data col-
lected for statistical purposes by the federal government is not vulnerable 
enough to disclosure, other data sets may be too vulnerable.
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Figure 5. Use of Pre-existing Surveya Data in Publications in Leading Economic Journalsb
Source: Chetty 2012. 
a. Pre-existing surveys are micro surveys such as the CPS; surveys using proprietary, administrative, or created 
datasets are not included. Sample excludes studies with a primary data source from a developing country. 
b. The four journals tracked here are the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), Econometrica (ECMA), the 
American Economic Review (AER), and the Journal of Political Economy (JPE). 
c. Percent of microdata-based articles, in four leading journals, that use survey data.  
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Figure 6. Use of Administrative Dataa in Publications in Leading Economic Journalsb
Source: Chetty 2012. 
a. Administrative datasets are datasets collected without directly surveying individuals (such as scanner data, 
school records). Sample excludes studies with a primary data source from a developing country.
b. The four journals tracked here are the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), Econometrica (ECMA), the 
American Economic Review (AER), and the Journal of Political Economy (JPE). 
c. Percent of microdata-based articles, in four leading journals, that use survey data.  
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For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes standards to protect 
people’s health and personal medical information.3 This means that insur-
ers, health care providers, and clearinghouses should ensure that any health 
information they release is not identifiable, in part by removing informa-
tion such as names and record numbers, much as government agencies do. 
However, these rules are likely insufficient.
A growing risk that is true of all personal data is that it is possible 
to map outside data sources onto published data in an attempt to iden-
tify people. As Abowd and Schmutte discuss, it is now known that peo-
ple can be identified using a small number of demographic attributes. 
The authors give some examples. Another example was demonstrated 
recently by researchers at Harvard, who showed that they could identify 
people in the Personal Genome Project with 97 percent success using 
participants’ ZIP codes, birth dates, and sex by simply matching these data 
with voter lists (Sweeney, Abu, and Winn 2013).
While many private-sector providers are limited in the types of informa-
tion they are able to make public, other detailed personal data—including 
identifying information that government data sets do not publish—are not 
subject to these constraints. For example, a simple Google search of the 
last name “Anderson” and a common male first name beginning with a 
“J” in the state of New York provided information on one Mr. Anderson’s 
age, phone number, and current and past addresses. Using these addresses, 
data from Zillow provides detailed information on Mr. Anderson’s current 
home, including the number of rooms, the price he paid for his home when 
he bought it in 2009, and how much he has paid in property taxes each 
year since.
All of this information is public record, but the fact that all of this 
information about Mr. Anderson could be found within 90 seconds illus-
trates the ease of access that private-sector actors commonly provide to 
information that many Americans would consider—and likely assume to 
be—private. And as the researchers showed with the Personal Genome 
Project, simply using Mr. Anderson’s age, ZIP code, and gender may be 
enough to link Mr. Anderson to sensitive information contained in sup-
posedly anonymous data sets. Similarly, research using 1990 U.S. Census 
3. The complete text of the “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996” (HIPAA) may be viewed at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ191/pdf/
PLAW-104publ191.pdf.
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 289
data found that 87 percent of Americans had reported characteristics that 
could uniquely identify them (Sweeney 2000). This expansion in access to 
very sensitive, privately collected data is driving some of the need to take 
greater care with our public-use files. In this way, what the private sector 
does to safeguard privacy is intimately linked to what the government 
statistical agencies need to do.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  John Haltiwanger spoke first to say that like the 
discussants, he thought this was a thought-provoking paper. It opened up 
the doors so that one could look into the sausage factory, so to speak, and 
see that what is inside is not very pretty. For example, on the survey side, 
nonresponse rates are incredibly high. So even before the statistical disclo-
sure limitation (SDL) occurs, an enormous amount of editing and impu-
tation goes on. Haltiwanger thought the paper was too optimistic about 
the potential virtues of using the synthetic data and validation, because so 
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much work in the statistical agencies goes into creating the micro-datasets, 
for example to figure out what industry a particular establishment belongs 
to or where it is located. In cleaning the data, those decisions are not made 
hard and fast or once and for all. In fact, the whole process is a moving 
target. Indeed, he added, people who work with the confidential data, as he 
does, spend most of their time on that data cleaning business.
He also felt it was important to recognize that the statistical agencies 
are very intensive users of administrative data, not only for the tabulations 
the authors discussed but also for micro-datasets, so all the SDL issues that 
they raised also apply to the administrative datasets. This is the case for 
county business patterns, the quarterly census of employment and wages, 
and a lot else.
Katharine Abraham agreed with discussant Caroline Hoxby that the 
main purpose of collecting survey data is to inform policy. Policy offi-
cials at organizations such as the Federal Reserve Board and the Depart-
ment of the Treasury care a great deal about having current information 
on employment, wages, output, prices and so on. Academic researchers 
typically have different needs, but in truth are not the data users that the 
economic statistics agencies view as their primary customers. The need 
for information on current economic conditions is unlikely to be satisfied 
by administrative data.
Abraham took issue with Hoxby’s suggestion that the statistical agen-
cies are overly concerned about the risk of disclosure. Serious hackers, 
paparazzi, and advertisers might have little interest in identifying the indi-
viduals or firms that have provided survey responses, she said, but there 
are other people who are very concerned about privacy and believe that 
the government collects too much information about its citizens. Such 
individuals could use any breach of privacy to embarrass the government 
and press for cutting back on what the government collects. From that 
standpoint, she is sympathetic to the statistical agencies’ concern about 
needing to protect the confidentiality of survey respondents. At the same 
time, Abraham agreed wholeheartedly with the goal of expanding access 
to raw data through the research data centers. Given the legal and budget-
ary constraints they face, she believes the statistical agencies have done 
a commendable job of finding ways to make micro-data available for 
research purposes.
Christopher Carroll picked up on a point made by discussant Betsey 
Stevenson concerning how decision makers in government agencies often 
have personal incentives on the job that are not aligned with benefiting the 
public as a whole. He argued that one way to address that problem might 
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 291
be to systematize professional rewards to academics who actively partici-
pate in the improvement and development of the data resource once an 
initial version has been created. That is, one should establish a permanent 
link between the research community and the agencies so that visiting 
academics have a voice in setting the public release policies, because in 
order for their research to be influential (or perhaps to be published) it is 
necessary for other scholars to have access to the data on which it is based. 
Outside researchers in this kind of role could be funded by the National 
Science Foundation, for example, and professional rewards could take the 
form of being given the first access to the data that one has helped to get 
released.
A more indirect but ultimately more powerful approach, Carroll thought, 
would be to further entrench and extend the ethic that government policy-
making should be evidence-based. Those inside a government agency could 
more easily push for allowing much more transparency in the data that are 
released if there is an expectation that making the public case for a policy 
requires transparent evidence.
Justin Wolfers suggested that the authors were not critical enough of 
the stupidity of statistical disclosure limitations. As an example, he men-
tioned a marital history supplement that he relies on in his work, where 
even such an obscure detail as whether a person had been divorced before 
1954 could not be disclosed, even though it could not possibly reveal to 
the public who a person was. The Current Population Survey is hamstrung 
by many such absurd limitations. It also struck Wolfers as very significant 
that, to his knowledge, to date not a single person has been prosecuted for 
breaking these disclosure laws.
A third point he wished to make was that historically, the people one 
ought to be most worried about violating individuals’ privacy are actually 
government policy makers. A very serious case of this was the Census 
Bureau’s exposure of the names and addresses of Japanese Americans 
during World War II when the government chose to intern those people 
in camps. Congress had passed a law giving the bureau the power to do 
this—the problem was not the research community.
Wolfers’ fourth and final comment was that those doing the damage ought 
to be identified plainly, and in his view there were two groups to blame: 
one, the Census Bureau employees who are deeply risk averse because 
they are more worried about their jobs and programs being killed than 
about the broader benefits to the American people, and two, the so-called 
Tea Party. The latter group of individuals has put real fear into the first 
group, who worry that as soon as a single example of a privacy breach 
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occurs it is going to be used as the political weapon with which to shut 
down the American Community Survey or even the Census Bureau itself.
Hoxby spoke up to clarify points she had made in her comment. First, 
when she spoke about valuable microdata that could take the place of 
survey data, she was referring to what people in applied micro economics 
now increasingly use: tax data, Social Security Administration data, Health 
and Human Services data, and so on. These data are now available to 
qualified researchers for numerous other countries. Research increas-
ingly focuses outside the United States as a result. However, even if one 
looks only at U.S.-focused studies, young researchers now rely mainly on 
administrative data rather than the much more expensive survey data. This 
is not because young researchers are naïve about the flaws in administrative 
data. Rather, despite their flaws, the administrative data are judged to be 
superior. The more young researchers know about statistical disclosure 
techniques, the more this view will be reinforced.
Hoxby argued that it is crucial for policy evaluation to be conducted 
by researchers outside the government. Yes, the government’s production 
of descriptive statistics is very valuable. However, it is naïve to think that 
people in the government, who have career and other incentives to support 
certain policies, should be the only ones with the untampered-with data and 
administrative data needed to conduct policy evaluation. When qualified 
outside researchers have access to data, evaluations of government policy 
are more disciplined and less likely to be propagandistic.
John Abowd responded to the comments first by addressing the topic of 
administrative data. In fact, he said, computer scientists have been discuss-
ing this issue for about a decade already. The most relevant person in this 
field is Cynthia Dwork, a lead scientist at Microsoft who has championed 
methods in computer science that apply the same statistical disclosure limi-
tation to every look at the data. The method is known as epsilon differential 
privacy and is well known to all of the younger computer science practi-
tioners. It imposes the inferential disclosure limit he had spoken of in his 
randomized response example, which was taken from Dwork and Aaron 
Roth’s published work on differential privacy.
With this method, a differential privacy filter is placed between every 
researcher and the data, something that is already normal at Microsoft when 
statistical researchers there look at confidential search logs. Our public 
agencies are not similarly constrained, but that is likely to change, because 
the people being trained at every leading university already know how to 
work this way to safeguard data privacy, and now they are collaborating 
with statisticians and economists.
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Abowd added that he and coauthor Ian Schmutte have written another 
paper that discusses the technological solutions to the privacy challenge 
and addresses the issues that Hoxby and Betsy Stevenson spoke about. 
It models the choices involved in handling the incentive problems that 
citizens are concerned about in the matter of safeguarding personal data. 
He added that trying to solve the problem by using administrative data as 
an alternative, although it is a work-around that he and many colleagues 
have been using for a full decade, is not a true solution but only kicks the 
core problem further down the road.
He agreed with Hoxby and Stevenson that part of the burden to solve 
this rests with the researchers and part of the burden rests with the statisti-
cal agencies. In this paper he and Schmutte stressed the users’ obligations 
simply because the research community can do something about that.
Responding to Haltiwanger’s point about the cleaning and editing of the 
raw data, he noted that the principal difference is that those activities are 
generally revealed in excruciating detail in the technical summaries and 
academic papers, and they are also flagged on most public-use datasets. In 
fact, the latest versions of the synthetic data projects at the Census Bureau 
flag all imputed variables, which researchers have the freedom to reverse if 
they wish. Anything that one can conceptualize probabilistically can be put 
into the synthetic data, so what matters most for researchers is that they be 
aware of what was done with the data beforehand, be it editing, imputation, 
sampling, or confidentiality protections. The paper tried to shine some light 
on the confidentiality protections.
Ian Schmutte had a short comment in response to Haltiwanger’s point as 
well. He noted that of all the disheartening things they observed when they 
peered inside the “sausage factory” of the statistical agencies, the methods 
associated with statistical disclosure limitations were much less concerning 
than other problems, such as the high nonresponse rates. He mentioned the 
work of Barry Hirsch, which has demonstrated how missing data and the 
imputations used to address them create very large problems in analyses. 
His impression is that the biases resulting from statistical disclosure limita-
tions are much smaller, although the suppression rate associated with this 
is, in fact, still unknown.
